No. 84-1403

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
MAR 5 1985
ALEXANDER L. STEVAS
CLERK

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1984

MANUEL ERIC VILLANUEVA,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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QUESTION PRESENTED

Did the drafters of the federal racketeering statute (RICO) intend to include marijuana offenses in the definition of "racketeering activity" codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)?

PARTIES BELOW

In addition to the United States of America, the following persons were parties to the proceedings in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the court whose judgment is sought to be reviewed:

Manuel Eric Villanueva
Gustavo J. Fernandez
Manuel W. James
Russell Hobson III
Antonio E. Bascaro
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OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported at 742 F.2d 1335 (11th Cir. 1984). It is reproduced in the Appendix to this petition at App. 1-50.

JURISDICTION

The judgment sought to be reviewed was dated and entered October 1, 1984. Rehearing and rehearing en banc were denied by an order of the Eleventh Circuit issued and filed December 6, 1984. App. 51. The statutory provision which confers jurisdiction on this Court to review the judgment in question by writ of certiorari is 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTES INVOLVED

The following pertinent statutes are reproduced in the Appendix:

18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(A), (D); (4); and (5) appear at App. 53;

18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c) and (d) appear at App. 53-54.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Manuel Eric Villanueva was allegedly involved in an organization which imported and distributed marijuana between 1977 and 1978. Villanueva was indicted in 1981 for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (RICO conspiracy); 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (substantive RICO violation); 21 U.S.C. § 848 (continuing criminal enterprise); 21 U.S.C. § 960 (conspiracy to import marijuana); 21 U.S.C. § 952(a) (importation of marijuana); 21 U.S.C. § 846 (conspiracy to possess marijuana); 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (possession of marijuana); 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) (unlawful use of a communication facility); and 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (interstate travel in aid of racketeering activity).

The government's theory before the district court—whose jurisdiction was based upon 18 U.S.C. § 3231—was that an organization existed for the purpose of importing large quantities of marijuana into the United States from Colombia, South America. Villanueva, Bascaro and one Jose Acosta were characterized as the organizers and principal decision-makers of the organization. The operation involved shrimp boat owners who imported marijuana, individuals in charge of unloading and storing the marijuana, individuals in charge of selling the marijuana and still others who purchased the marijuana. The 30-count indictment charged a total of twelve persons with having participated in this operation.

Villanueva was tried in 1982 and found guilty of RICO conspiracy, a completed RICO substantive offense, conspiracy to import marijuana, possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute, engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise and interstate travel in aid of a racketeering enterprise. He was sentenced to a term of 60 years' imprisonment and a $220,000 fine.

Villanueva was convicted of violating two provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 1961 *et seq.*, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt

Organizations Act (RICO): a substantive violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) by conducting or participating in the conduct of an enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity, and conspiring to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). These convictions were premised upon the government's allegations that the petitioner had been involved in the marijuana trafficking organization described above. The government employed these allegations as predicates for the assertion that Villanueva had engaged in a "pattern of racketeering activity" as defined by the statute. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5).

The petitioner sought to overturn his racketeering convictions in the Court of Appeals on the grounds, *inter alia*, that marijuana offenses cannot be used as predicate offenses under the RICO statute. The Court of Appeals rejected petitioner's argument. It is this issue for which petitioner requests the Court's review.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The Court Of Appeals' Decision Is Irreconcilable With The Clear Legislative History Of The Federal Racketeering Statute; For That Reason The Decision Presents An Important Issue Of Federal Law Which Can Only Be Conclusively Determined By This Court.

The Court of Appeals rejected petitioner's argument on the impermissibility of employing marijuana offenses as RICO predicates, holding that it was foreclosed by the decision in *United States* v. *Phillips*, 664 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1981). With all deference to the doctrine of *stare decisis*, this holding is incorrect and unsatisfactory. It is incorrect because the issue which petitioner raised was neither argued nor decided in *Phillips*: The appellant in *Phillips* had argued that marijuana offenses were not "within the ambit of RICO because marijuana is not a narcotic or dangerous drug." 664 F.2d at 1039. In a rather cursory passage, the Fifth Circuit rejected this argument because it found that "marijuana has

been classified as a Schedule I controlled substance." *Id.* From this finding the Court then concluded that "[m]arijuana may be the subject matter of a RICO charge." *Id.* at 1040.

Whatever the merits of this argument and holding, it is clear that the issue which petitioner raised in his brief was not addressed in *Phillips*. It is, therefore, equally clear that the *Phillips* holding did not foreclose the issue raised by the petitioner. *See, e.g., Webster* v. *Fall*, 266 U.S. 507, 511 (1925) ("Questions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor relied upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided as to constitute precedent."); *see also United States* v. *L.A. Tucker Truck Lines*, 344 U.S. 33, 38 (1952).

However, it is not the petitioner's intent to challenge the Court of Appeals' utilization of the *Phillips* holding. It is, instead, petitioner's goal to secure review of the result produced by the Court of Appeals' utilization of the *Phillips* holding. Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals' action was incorrect because it foreclosed review of an important issue of law, namely, the proper construction of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)'s definition of "racketeering activity."

The Court of Appeals' action is also unsatisfactory because by refusing to consider the appropriate construction to be given to 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)'s definition of racketeering activity, the Court of Appeals effectively gave its imprimatur to what the petitioner argues is an incorrect construction of that definition. This is an unsatisfactory state of affairs because it permits the government to employ marijuana offenses as predicates for RICO charges, a situation which is a direct contravention of the legislative intent responsible for the statute.

A. The Legislative History Of The Statute Unequivocally Establishes That Congress Did Not Intend That Marijuana Offenses Be Included In 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)'s Definition Of Racketeering Activity.

The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization statute is an enactment of labyrinthine genealogy. Because that genealogy has been traced in great detail elsewhere, it will not be explored in unnecessary depth here. *See, e.g.*, Blakey, *Materials on RICO: Criminal Overview*, 1 Techniques in the Investigation of Organized Crime 58-105 (Cornell Institute on Organized Crime, Blakey ed. 1980); Blakey & Gettings, *Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts—Criminal and Civil Remedies*, 53 Temp. L. Q. 1009, 1014-20 (1980); Bradley, *Racketeers, Congress, and the Courts: An Analysis of RICO*, 65 Iowa L. Rev. 837, 837-45 (1980).

What is explored below are two crucial aspects of the statute's history, namely, the social forces providing the impetus for such an enactment and the unsuccessful proposals that preceded the introduction of what would become the RICO statute.

1. Legislative History: A Selective Review

RICO was a product of the nation's discovery of organized crime, a discovery that began in 1951 with the disclosures of the Kefauver Committee, progressed through Joseph Valachi's revelations about "La Cosa Nostra" and culminated with the report and recommendation submitted by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice [hereinafter, "the Commission"]. *See, e.g.*, Blakey, *Materials on RICO, supra*, at 70-72 and Bradley, *Racketeers, Congress, and the Courts, supra*, at 837-39; *see also* President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, *Task Force Report: Organized Crime* (1967) [hereinafter, "*Organized Crime*"]. A major concern that grew out of this discovery was organized crime's infiltration of legitimate businesses, an infiltration described in some detail in the Commission's reports. *See, e.g., Organized Crime* at 4; *see also* S. Rep. No. 141, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1951).

According to the Commission, an important means for effectuating this infiltration was the investment of "concealed profits acquired from gambling and other illegal activities" in legitimate business operations. *Organized Crime, supra*, at 4; *see also* President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, *The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society* 190 (1967) [hereinafter, "*Challenge*"]. The Commission recommended that new measures be developed to combat this infiltration. *Challenge, supra*, at 208.

In 1967 two bills were introduced in an attempt to implement the Commission's recommendations: S. 2048 proposed an amendment to the Sherman Antitrust Act prohibiting the investment of "intentionally unreported income" in "any business enterprise." S. 2048, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). Its companion, S. 2049, prohibited the acquisition of an interest in a business affecting interstate commerce with income derived from "criminal activity." S. 2049, § 1 (No. 1), 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). "Criminal activity" was defined as including "the manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, or otherwise dealing in *narcotic drugs or marihuana*." *Id.* (emphasis supplied).

The two bills were referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, where they died without being acted upon.[1] 113 Cong. Rec. 18007 (1967); Blakey, *Materials on RICO, supra*, at 78. The Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association conducted its own analysis of the bills, however, and concluded that, while antitrust-style measures were an appropriate means for attacking illegitimate infiltrations of legitimate businesses, such means should be contained in independent criminal statutes rather than appended to the Sherman Antitrust Act. *See House Hearings on S. 30*, 91st

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[1] Bills paralleling the provisions of S. 2048 and S. 2049 were introduced in the House by Congressman Poff. H. R. 11766 and H. R. 11268, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 113 Cong. Rec. 17976 (1967). Senator Hruska was responsible for the introduction of both S. 2048 and S. 2049. 115 Cong. Rec. 6993 (1969).

Cong., 2d Sess. 149 (1970); Blakey, *Materials on RICO, supra*, at 78.

In 1969 Senator McClellan, joined by Senators Hruska, Allen and Ervin, introduced S. 30 into the 91st Congress; the bill was a response to a number of other recommendations presented by the Commission, and reflected Senator McClellan's long-standing interest in organized crime.[2] *See* 115 Cong. Rec. 5877 (1969) (remarks of Senator McClellan upon the introduction of S. 30). S. 30, entitled the Organized Crime Control Act of 1969, was a general reform bill intended to eliminate existing difficulties in prosecuting organized crime figures by remedying existing "defects in the evidence gathering process." 115 Cong. Rec. 5877 (1969); S. 30, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).[3] S. 30 did not originally contain RICO-style provisions intended to combat the infiltration of legitimate business. Blakey, *Materials on RICO, supra*, at 79-80.

On March 20, 1969 Senator Hruska, who had sponsored the by-now defunct S. 2048 and S. 2049, introduced S. 1623, entitled the Criminal Activities Profits Act. S. 1623, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 Cong. Rec. 6995-96 (1969). S. 1623 combined the concepts contained in S. 2048 and S. 2049 into a

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[2] Senator McClellan had a long involvement with the problem of organized crime: It was the McClellan Committee which documented the infiltration of labor unions by organized crime, and it was the McClellan Committee which was responsible for eliciting Joseph Valachi's public revelations regarding the existence and operation of "La Cosa Nostra." *See* S. Rep. No. 1784, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962); S. Rep. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); *Organized Crime and Illicit Traffic in Narcotics: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations*, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).

[3] As introduced, S. 30 contained nine titles and encompassed such areas as grand jury operations, immunity, contempt, false statements, witness protection, depositions and increased punishment for "organized crime offenders." *See* S. 30, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 Cong. Rec. 39906–07 (1969).

single bill, retaining S. 2049's definition of "criminal activity" as including "the manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying or otherwise dealing in *narcotic drugs or marihuana.*" S. 1623, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. §2 [sic] (1) (1969); 115 Cong. Rec. 6993 (1969) (remarks of Senator Hruska upon introduction of S. 1623) (emphasis supplied). Hearings were held by the Senate on S. 30 and S. 1623 and as a consequence of those hearings a replacement bill was drafted and introduced by Senators McClellan and Hruska. Blakey, *Materials on Rico, supra*, at 80; *see also* 115 Cong. Rec. 9567 (1969) (remarks of Senator McCelian upon introduction of S. 1861).

S. 1861, introduced on April 18, 1969, provided criminal penalties for engaging in any of three varieties of "[p]rohibited racketeering activities": (1) using income "derived . . . from a pattern of racketeering activity" to acquire an interest in/establish/operate any enterprise engaged in or affecting interstate commerce; (2) acquiring or maintaining an interest in or control of such an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity; and (3) conducting or participating in the conduct of such an enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. S. 1861, § 1962(a)-(c), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), included in *Measures Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings on S. 30, S. 974, S. 975, S. 976, S. 1623, S. 1624, S. 1816, S. 2022, S. 2122 and S. 2292 Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedure of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary*, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 66-67 (1969) [hereinafter, "*Measures Relating to Organized Crime*"]. A "pattern of racketeering activity" consisted of one act of racketeering activity. *Id.* at 65.

"Racketeering activity" was defined as including any of a list of offenses proscribed in various sections of the United States Code, none of which related to narcotics, marijuana or any other controlled substance, and as including the following conduct: "Any act involving the danger of violence to life, limb or property, indictable under State or Federal law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year."

Id. at 63. S. 1861 and other organized crime bills were referred to the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedure of the Senate Judiciary Committee, where S. 1861 was the target of critiques and recommendations from various sources. 115 Cong. Rec. 6925, 9512 (1969); *Measures Relating to Organized Crime, supra*, at 268, 405-06, 475-77.

One source was the Justice Department: In a letter to Senator McClellan, Deputy Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst presented the Department's views on S. 1861. *Measures Relating to Organized Crime, supra*, at 404-08. The letter included two recommendations pertinent to this discussion. The first resulted from the Justice Department's conclusion that S. 1861's definition of "racketeering activity" as including "any act involving the danger of violence to life, limb or property . . . " was too broad to withstand constitutional scrutiny. *Id.* at 405. Therefore, the Department recommended that this proviso be replaced with the following language: "The term 'racketeering activity' means . . . any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, usury or *dealing in narcotic drugs, marihuana or other dangerous drugs.*" *Id.* (emphasis supplied). The second recommendation resulted from the Department's conclusion that S. 1861 erred in defining a "pattern of racketeering activity" as consisting of one act of racketeering activity; the Justice Department recommended that the term be redefined to require "at least two such acts." *Id.*

After concluding its hearings on S. 1861 and similar proposals, the Senate incorporated the provisions of S. 1861 into S. 30; S. 1861 became title IX of S. 30, which passed the Senate on January 23, 1970 as the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. Blakey, *Materials on RICO, supra*, at 92-95; Bradley, *Racketeers, Congress, and the Courts, supra*, at 842-43. Along with incorporating S. 1861 into S. 30, the Senate made certain revisions in S. 1861: One of these was redefining "pattern of racketeering activity" to require "at least two acts of racketeering activity." *Organized Crime Control: Hearings on S. 30 and Related Proposals Before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary*, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 52

(1970) [hereinafter, "*House Hearings*"]. This, of course, followed the recommendation presented by the Justice Department.[4]

A second revision altered S. 1861's definition of "racketeering activity." The definition's inclusion of a list of proscribed offenses defined by the United States Code was retained and expanded.[5] *House Hearings, supra*, at 50-51. And, even more importantly, the definition was rewritten to incorporate the major part of the Justice Department's recommendation concerning the non-list proviso. That is, the definition was revised to include the following language: " '[R]acketeering activity' means . . . any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, *or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs.*" *House Hearings, supra*, at 50 (emphasis supplied). This, of course, adopts the exact language employed in the Justice Department's recommendation except for the omission of two items: Usury is omitted from the list, and marijuana is omitted from the Justice Department's inclusion of it between "narcotic" and "other dangerous drugs." *See, e.g., Measures Relating to Organized Crime, supra*, at 405. The

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[4] For the Committee's explanation of why it adopted the Justice Department's recommendation, *see* Senate Committee on the Judiciary, *Report on the Organized Crime Control Act of 1969*, S. Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969) [hereinafter, "S. Rep. No. 617"].

[5] This aspect of the definition was expanded in two regards: The list of specified offenses was increased and the following new language was added to that list: "any offense involving . . . the manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling or otherwise dealing in *narcotic or other dangerous drugs*, punishable under any law of the United States." *House Hearings, supra*, at 51 (emphasis supplied); *compare* the language in S. 1861, *Measures Relating to Organized Crime, supra*, at 63-64. This language should be compared to the language of two precursor bills, S. 2049 and S. 1623, both of which refer to "the manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying or otherwise dealing in *narcotic drugs or marihuana*." S. 2049, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); S. 1623, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) (emphasis supplied).

significance of this latter omission is explored in some detail in §2, *infra*.

After its passage in the Senate, S. 30 was sent to the House, which referred it to the Committee on the Judiciary for study. 116 Cong. Rec. 1103 (1970). The House approached S. 30 with some reservations, reservations based upon a number of similar bills that had been introduced in the House. Blakey, *Materials on RICO*, *supra*, at 95-97. Beginning with the House's counterparts of S. 2048 and S. 2049, *see* n.1, *supra*, a series of bills had been introduced into the House that were intended to prevent the illegitimate infiltration of American business.

H.R. 11766 and H.R. 11268, the House analogues, respectively, of S. 2048 and S. 2049, were introduced in 1967 and suffered the same fate as the Senate bills. *See* Blakey & Gettings, *Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations*, *supra*, at 1016 n.27. Analytically, these precursor bills are separable into two categories. One category, consisting of ten different measures introduced during 1969, mimicked the language of S. 2049 by prohibiting the investment of funds derived from "criminal activity" in legitimate businesses; "criminal activity" was defined as "any act involving murder, kidnapping, extortion, bankruptcy fraud or the manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, or otherwise *dealing in narcotic drugs or marihuana*." *See* H.R. 326, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. 760, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. 2154, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. 2697, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. 2794, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. 5216, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. 7596, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. 9327, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. 9710, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. 10077, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) (emphasis supplied).

The second category of House bills commenced with measures stressing rather unspecific concerns about the evils of organized crime, *see, e.g.*, H.R. 9704, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), progressed through the House's version of S. 1861, *see, e.g.*, H.R. 10723, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), and culminated in six proposals that paralleled the final version of S. 30.

H.R. 15507, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); H.R. 15698, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); H.R. 16134, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); H.R. 17541, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); H.R. 18279, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); H.R. 18517, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). Each of these six proposals paralleled the final version of S. 30 in defining "racketeering activity" in terms of "*dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs*" and in terms of "any offense involving . . . the manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in *narcotic or other dangerous drugs.*" *See House Hearings, supra*, at 1104-05; 1179-80; 1259-60; 1372-73; 1438-39; and 1513-14 (emphasis supplied); *see also*, H.R. 19215, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) and H.R. 19586, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).

The House considered S. 30 at length, and adopted a number of revisions, none of which is pertinent to the issue under consideration. *See* Blakey, *Materials on RICO, supra*, at 97-104. On October 7, 1970 the House passed S. 30 as amended; S. 30 was approved by the Senate on October 12, 1970 and was signed into law by the President on October 15, 1970. Bradley, *Racketeers, Congress and the Courts, supra*, at 844-45 n.32; 116 Cong. Rec. 35340, 35347 (1970). The RICO statute created by title IX of S. 30 defines "racketeering activity" as including "(A) any act or threat involving . . . *dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs*" and "(D) any offense involving . . . the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise *dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs.*" 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A), (D) (emphasis supplied). Nowhere is marijuana mentioned.

2. The Legislative History of the RICO Statute Conclusively Establishes that Marijuana Offenses are not Included in the Statute's Definition of Racketeering Activity.

It must already be apparent, even from this necessarily cursory review of legislative history, that marijuana offenses were not intended to be encompassed within RICO's definition of racketeering activity. Before extrapolating upon the inevitability of this conclusion, it is necessary to review some basic premises of statutory construction.

Statutory construction begins with a single, controlling premise, a premise that describes the respective roles which the legislature and the courts play in law-making: The legislature's role is to enact those measures which it deems necessary and proper; the courts' role is to "ascertain the Congressional intent [underlying these enactments] and give effect to the legislative will." *Philbrook* v. *Glodgett*, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975); *see also*, 2A *Sutherland Statutory Construction* § 45.05 (1984 rev.); R. Dickerson, *The Interpretation and Application of Statutes* 1-33 (1975). Implicit in this proposition, of course, is the generally unarticulated but fundamental assumption that legislative actions are purposive; though itself unarticulated, this assumption is the source for such specific rules of statutory construction as that which holds that the legislature "will not be presumed to have done a vain and useless thing." *See, e.g.*, *Rittenberry* v. *Lewis*, 222 F. Supp. 717, 719 (E.D. Tenn. 1963), *aff'd*, 333 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1964); *Kish* v. *Montana State Prison*, 161 Mont. 297, 505 P.2d 891 (1973); *see also International Telephone & Telegraph Corporation* v. *American Telephone & Telegraph Co.*, 444 F. Supp. 1148, 1154-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (Courts must "assume that every Congressional enactment is purposive.").

This presumption against inadvertence finds expression in other rules employed in statutory construction, one of which concerns omissions in the language of a statute. When confronted with omissions in the language of a statute, a court must interpret the language as written: "[O]ur problem is to construe what Congress has written. . . . It is for us to ascertain—neither to add nor to subtract, neither to delete nor to distort." *62 Cases, More or Less, Each Containing Six Jars of Jam* v. *United States*, 340 U.S. 593, 596 (1951); *see also Doski* v. *Goldseker*, 539 F.2d 1326 (4th Cir. 1976); *Fisher Flouring Mills Co.* v. *United States*, 270 F.2d 27 (9th Cir. 1959). This principle is an aspect of the historic maxim of statutory construction, "*expressio unius est exclusio alterius.*" ("Expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." *Black's Law Dictionary*, 692 [4th ed., 1951]); *see, e.g.*, 2A *Sutherland Statutory Construction* § 47.23 (1984 rev.).

It is this presumption against legislative inadvertence which conclusively establishes that marijuana offenses were not intended to be included in the definition of racketeering activity ultimately codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). Section 1, *supra*, describes in some detail the processes which led to the enactment of the RICO statute. The initial legislative step in this process was the introduction of S. 2048 and S. 2049 in the Senate and of correlates in the House of Representatives. S. 2049 prohibited employing the proceeds of "criminal activity" to acquire interests in legitimate business and defined "criminal activity" as including "dealing in narcotic drugs or marihuana." S. 2049, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). Thus, the issue of marijuana offenses was introduced into the legislative deliberations of racketeering at the outset. The issue remained before the legislature, both the House and the Senate, throughout the three years of those deliberations: S. 2049, and its House correlate, was followed by a series of bills in both houses that phrased the activity to be banned as representing racketeering in terms of marijuana offenses. *See* § 1, *supra*; *see, e.g.*, S. 1623, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) and H. R. 326, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).

Indeed, the Justice Department called this issue to Congress' attention when it formally recommended that S. 1861's definition of "racketeering activity" be revised to include "*dealing in narcotic drugs, marihuana or other dangerous drugs.*" *Measures Relating to Organized Crime*, *supra*, at 405 (emphasis supplied). And the Senate acted on this recommendation: S. 1861's definition of "racketeering activity" was amended in almost-accordance with the Department's recommendation prior to S. 1861's incorporation into S. 30 and its embarkation upon its eventual career as a RICO statute. *See* n.5 and accompanying text, *supra*. However, the amendment omitted "marihauna" despite including almost all the rest of the Justice Department's recommendations. This omission cannot have been inadvertent; inadvertence is negated not only by the above-described presumption against inadvertence but also by the fact that the Department's recommendation included marijuana. This inclusion became omission only

through some conscious, volitional act; and such an act requires the inference of intentional exclusion. This inference is further supported by the fact that the Senate adopted, essentially verbatim, the Department's recommendation that "pattern of racketeering activity" be defined as consisting of *two* acts of racketeering activity. *See* n.4 and accompanying text, *supra*.

Adoption of the Justice Department's definition of "pattern of racketeering activity" reinforces the inference that the Senate was acting upon the Department's recommendation, an inference which is supported by certain statements to this effect in the legislative history. *See* n.4, *supra*. This, in turn, leads to the inference that the exclusion of terms included in those recommendations was an intentional act reflecting a conscious legislative purpose. This latter inference is buttressed by the *nature* of the omissions: Two terms were omitted from the Department's proposed version of the definition of "racketeering activity"; these terms were "marihuana" and "usury." *See, e.g., Measures Relating to Organized Crime, supra*, at 405 and *House Hearings, supra*, at 50.

The omission of usury from the list of predicate offenses was clearly a result of the incorporation of provisions governing "collection of unlawful debt." *See, e.g., Measures Relating to Organized Crime, supra*, at 65-67 and *House Hearings, supra*, at 52-55. The provisions on "collection of unlawful debt" would make the inclusion of usury in the section defining "racketeering activity" a redundancy; it is inferentially obvious that this is the reason for omitting usury from S. 30. And while the reasons for the omission of "marihuana" from the same section are not as immediately obvious, it is equally apparent that this was an intentional exclusion.[6] The purposive nature of this exclusion is apparent from an inclusion appended to the language of

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[6] Nor can this assessment be rebutted by the readily foreseeable counterargument that references to marijuana were deleted because Congress felt that inclusion of such a reference would be, at best, a useless redundancy since "dangerous drugs" subsumes marijuana. This counterargument is, itself, rebutted by two

(footnote continued on next page)

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factors: One is the consistency with which marijuana was included in proposals that also included "dangerous drugs"; assuredly, this consistency gives rise to the inference that the inclusion was purposive and represented an additive function.

The second factor refers, again, to the "context" of the statute: As was described above, the RICO statute was the product of a general concern about the growth of organized crime and the attendant specific concern about organized crime's infiltration of legitimate business. *See* § 1, *supra.* Though information about organized crime's proliferation had been revealed as early as the 1951 Kefauver hearings, the concern with organized crime culminated with, and as a proximate result of, the reports produced by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. *See* § 1, *supra.* Among those reports was one addressing the problem of drug abuse and organized crime's responsibility therefor. *See* President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, *Task Force Report: Narcotics and Drug Abuse* (1967). The report carefully reviews the nature and effects of the various substances categorized as promoting "drug abuse." *Id.* at 1-5. In so doing, the report carefully distinguishes between "marihuana" and "dangerous drugs." *Id.* at 2-4.

"Dangerous drugs" refers to "three classes of nonnarcotic drugs that are habit-forming or have a potential for abuse because of their stimulant, depressant or hallucinogenic effect." *Id.* at 4. Dangerous drugs include, respectively, amphetamines, barbiturates, and LSD and mescaline. *Id.* at 4-5. Not only is marijuana treated as a separate category from dangerous drugs, it is given independent consideration both as a substance with the potential for abuse and as a substance with an uncertain relationship to crime, organized or otherwise. *See id.* at 12-14.

Because the RICO statute, and the preliminaries thereto, were based upon the concerns and information presented in the Commission's reports, it is inferentially apparent that the drafters of the statute operated upon the basis of the analysis presented in those reports. Therefore, it is equally apparent that Congress did *not* intend "dangerous drugs" to encompass marijuana.

S. 1861 prior to its incorporation into S. 30 and its transmission to the House: As originally proposed in the Senate, S. 1861 did not include what would become 18 U.S.C. § 1961(D)'s definition of "racketeering activity" as including "any offense involving . . . the manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs." *Measures Relating to Organized Crime, supra,* at 63-64.

The fact that this language was appended is of far less significance than is the form which the added language took: This language is identical to language appearing in the parallel definitional sections of S. 2049 and its House correlate, S. 1623 and at least ten of the precursor bills introduced in the House prior to the enactment of S. 30, *see* discussion *supra* at 11, except for *one* omission. That omission is the word "marihuana": All these prior measures employed the identical list of acts in regard to the specified substances, but each and every one of these measures concluded by referring to "dealing in narcotic drugs or marihuana." *See* § 1, *supra.*

It is of course true that there were six House measures that employed language identical to that eventually adopted as 18 U.S.C. § 1961(D). *See* § 1, *supra.* However, these measures were introduced into the House *after* the language in S. 1861 had been amended to incorporate these changes: S. 30, as amended, was passed in the Senate on January 23, 1970. Bradley, *Racketeers, Congress, and the Courts, supra,* 842-843. The six House measures in question were introduced on the following dates: H. R. 15507 (January 22, 1970); H. R. 15698 (February 5, 1970); H. R. 16134 (February 24, 1970); H. R. 17541 (May 7, 1970); H. R. 18279 (June 30, 1970); H. R. 18517 (July 20, 1970). It is clear, therefore, that these bills were emulating the language of S. 30, rather than the reverse.

And this means that the language eventually enacted as 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(D) can only have been adopted from the above-discussed precursor House and Senate bills, all of which refer to "narcotic drugs or marihuana." Though the

other language of these provisions was incorporated into S. 1861 cum S. 30 almost verbatim, "narcotic drugs or marihuana" was changed to "narcotic or other dangerous drugs." This is the second instance in which the drafters of S. 30, which became the present RICO statute with this language unaltered, intentionally omitted marijuana offenses from the definition of racketeering activity. It is, again, inferentially obvious that this omission was a conscious, volitional act, rather than one of inadvertence. It is equally apparent, inferentially, that the intent was to exclude marijuana offenses from the statute's coverage.

Though this parsing of the statute's legislative history leads to the irresistible conclusion that marijuana offenses were not intended to be included in the statute's definition of "racketeering activity," such a conclusion, without more, is rather unsatisfying in its analytical sterility. Given the irresistibility of the conclusion, the logical inquiry then becomes *why* this exclusion. The answer to this inquiry can be found in those long-ago discussed social forces that provided the impetus for the statute's enactment.

RICO was a product of the nation's concern about organized crime's infiltration of legitimate business; a primary means whereby this infiltration was effectuated was through the investment of proceeds from unlawful activities in legitimate enterprises. *See* § 1, *supra*. Congress undertook the enactment of a statute that would prevent this infiltration; the concern for preventing the employment of unlawfully-procured funds to take over legitimate businesses runs throughout RICO's legislative history. *See, e.g., House Hearings, supra,* at 86-87, 293, 401; *Measures Relating to Organized Crime, supra,* at 1-2, 387, 440-45, 493-501 (statement of Senator McClellan upon the provisions of S. 30).

This concern, however, is always expressed in terms of preventing the investment of funds from certain criminal activities in legitimate businesses. These activities, identified by the Commission as organized crime's most lucrative activities, included illegal gambling and the sale of narcotics.

See, e.g., Challenge, supra, at 187-96; 116 Cong. Rec. 952-72 (1970). Therefore, in striking at organized crime's ability to infiltrate businesses, Congress was concerned with drafting a statute that would encompass these activities; this concern also permeates the legislative history, and it is always phrased in terms of "narcotics," of the addictive opiates that provided a major source of income for organized crime. *See* 116 Cong. Rec. 952-72 (1970); 116 Cong. Rec. 575-82 (1970); *see also* 116 Cong. Rec. 35295 (1970) (" 'Racketeering activity' is defined to include a wide variety of crimes, both State and Federal, that are generally associated with organized crime"). Indeed, Senator McClellan, the guiding spirit of the statute, made this clear in his remarks concerning the need for the statute, made on the Senate floor and incorporated into the legislative history. *Measures Relating to Organized Crime, supra,* at 493-97.

Legislative history being what it is, it would be possible to belabor the above to the point of reader stupefaction. That is, fortunately, not necessary: The comments on the legislature's concern in enacting a RICO statute are only offered to explain *why* marijuana was not included in the statute's coverage. Marijuana was not included because it was not perceived as being a means by which organized crime obtained the funds required for its invasion of legitimate enterprise. *See generally* President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, *Task Force Report: Narcotics and Drug Abuse* (1967).

The underlying concerns producing the enactment of the statute are artifacts legitimately employed in construing the meaning of that enactment. These concerns are an aspect of what one scholar refers to as the "context" of a statute. R. Dickerson, *The Interpretation and Application of Statutes* 103-24 (1975). Concerns such as those described above form relevant, albeit tacit, assumptions shaping the final enactment. *Id.* at 120-22. Consequently, these assumptions are essential in understanding the whys and wherefores of the final product. *Id.* However, because of their implicitness, assumptions

of this sort are frequently unavailable to those confronted with the task of interpreting a particular enactment.

In this instance, however, there are indicia of those assumptions. One such indicator is the social and legislative history sketched above. A second is the view of the draftsman of the statute, Professor Robert Blakey, who reports that marijuana was not intended to be included within the Act's coverage. Blakey, *Materials on RICO*, *supra*, at 24. Whatever the degree of deference accorded to the substance of Professor Blakey's views, the existence of those views certainly lends inferential credence to the above-described assessment of the contextual influences responsible for the statute, an assessment indicating the non-inclusion of marijuana offenses in the statute's coverage.

CONCLUSION

Petitioner believes that the issue presented in his petition is of great moment because it concerns the proper construction to be given to a pre-eminent federal criminal statute. This construction is of both great importance and great urgency given that a Court of Appeals has sanctioned an interpretation which is clearly antagonistic to Congress' intent in enacting the measure.

Only this Court can rectify the egregious error committed by the Court of Appeals, and only this Court can prevent the innumerable miscarriages of justice which will inevitably result from that error.

For all these reasons the petitioner respectfully requests that this Court grant review of this issue.

Respectfully submitted

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Dated: March 5, 1985

2396P

APPENDIX 1

UNITED STATES of America,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Antonio E. BASCARO, Partick M. Waldrop, Russell Hobson, III, Manuel Eric Villanueva, Gustavo J. Fernandez, Manuel W. James, Defendants-Appellants.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee,

v.

Manuel W. JAMES, Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant.

Nos. 82-5547, 82-6043.

United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.

Oct. 1, 1984.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida.

Before HENDERSON and CLARK, Circuit Judges, and ATKINS* District Judge.

CLARK, Circuit Judge:

Appellants were tried and convicted in the Northern District of Florida on drug conspiracy charges. Their convictions are founded upon a series of incidents taking place in

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* Honorable C. Clyde Atkins, U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of Florida, sitting by designation.

1977 and 1978, involving the importation of massive quantities of marijuana into the United States from Colombia, South America.[1]

Generally stated, the appellants, together with six other individuals (four of whom have either pled guilty or been separately tried and convicted, and two of whom remain fugitives), were charged in a thirty-count indictment in connection with their alleged involvement in a drug smuggling ring. Evidence adduced at trial indicates that appellants Bascaro and Villanueva, together with one Jose Acosta, who was separately tried and convicted, were the organizers and principal decision makers of the enterprise. Appellant Fernandez was responsible for overseeing the purchase of vessels to haul marijuana, and the hiring of crews to operate such vessels. Marijuana procured in Colombia and brought into the United States on board various vessels was purchased by appellants Hobson and Waldrop, among others, from an unindicted co-conspirator, Bill Cobb. Appellant James, an attorney, was the functional equivalant of "house counsel" for the group; James furnished legal advice, prepared documentation on fishing vessels owned by organization participants, and represented group members in criminal matters arising in connection with enterprise dealings.

James was convicted on one count only—conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute.[2] All other defendants were found guilty of conspiracy to violate the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)[3]; completed RICO substantive offenses[4]; conspiracy to import marijuana[5]; possession of marijuana with intent to

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[1] One co-conspirator who turned state's evidence estimated the quantity of marijuana imported during the time of his involvement with the defendants as between .75 and 1.5 million pounds.

[2] 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a); 846.

[3] 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d).

[4] 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).

[5] 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a); 963.

distribute[6] (Bascaro—four counts; Villanueva, Fernandez and Waldrop—two counts; Hobson—one count); and with the exception of Bascaro, conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute.[7] In addition, Bascaro and Villanueva were convicted of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise,[8] and interstate travel in aid of racketeering enterprises,[9] and Hobson and Waldrop were convicted of importing marijuana.[10]

The appellants raise a myriad of issues on appeal, a number of which have been adopted by some or all defendants, and others that apply only to one or two defendants in particular. We shall first address those issues common to all or nearly all appellants.

Common Issues

I. In General—Marijuana Related Offenses as a Basis for Prosecution Under RICO

The Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1962, makes it unlawful to conduct or participate in the conduct of an enterprise affecting interstate commerce, through a pattern of racketeering activity, and also makes it a crime to conspire to do so. Racketeering activity is defined in terms of a laundry list of offenses, including "the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in *narcotic or other dangerous drugs,* punishable under any law of the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(D) (emphasis supplied).

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[6] 21 U.S.C. § 841.

[7] 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a); 846.

[8] 21 U.S.C. § 848.

[9] 18 U.S.C. § 1952.

[10] 18 U.S.C. § 952(a).

Joining appellant Hobson in his brief to this court is G. Robert Blakey, a professor of law at Notre Dame and a principal drafter of the RICO statute. Professor Blakey argues that marijuana offenses do not qualify as racketeering activity under RICO, because Congress did not intend the phrase "narcotic or other dangerous drugs" to include marijuana offenses. In support of his position, he points out that proposed drafts of the Act, listing marijuana in addition to narcotic and other dangerous drugs, were considered but ultimately rejected, and that in the federal wiretap statute, which Professor Blakey also had a hand in drafting, wiretaps were authorized for suspected offenses involving "narcotic drugs, *marihuana*, or other dangerous drugs." 18 U.S.C. § 2516(e) (emphasis supplied). Since Congress separately listed marijuana alongside narcotic or other dangerous drugs in the wiretap statute, its failure to do so in the RICO statute, the argument goes, reflects a congressional intent to exclude marijuana offenses from coverage under the Act.

Our consideration of the appellants' argument is foreclosed by *United States v. Phillips*, 664 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981). In *Phillips*, as here, it was argued that RICO did not apply to marijuana offenses. The holding in *Phillips* was explicit: "Marijuana may be the subject matter of a RICO charge," *Phillips* 664 F.2d at 1040. The appellants argue that *Phillips* is not controlling, because there, the basis for the defendant's claim was that marijuana is neither a narcotic nor a dangerous drug in fact, whereas here, the claim is grounded in legislative history and intent. However, the mere act of proffering additional reasons not expressly considered previously for accepting a particular statutory interpretation that has been explicitly rejected by a panel of our court, will not open the door to reconsideration of the question by a second panel. In short, *Phillips* held that marijuana *may* be the subject matter of a RICO charge; we are not at liberty to hold that it may not.

II. Issues Relating to Matters Arising Prior to Trial

A. The Wiretap

On January 5, 1979, Florida law enforcement agent Stephen Dobson applied for and received authorization from a Florida circuit court judge to intercept telephone conversations on two telephones listed to unindicted co-conspirator Bill Cobb, for a period of thirty days. Within that thirty-day period, Cobb had the numbers on both of his telephones changed; the telephone company refused to intercept the new numbers without new court orders, and so Dobson returned to court on January 15 and 29 and obtained amendments to the January 5 order, substituting the new numbers for the old. On February 2, 1979, Dobson applied for and was granted a thirty-day extension of the amended January 5 authorization, and it was during the extension period that certain telephone calls were intercepted incriminating several of the appellants.

1. Newly discovered evidence that the wiretap order was issued on the basis of false information

The appellants' initial challenge respecting the sufficiency of the wiretap application concerns what might best be termed "newly discovered evidence." Dobson's original affidavit relied in part upon information obtained from an informant, Rayburn Morgan. In the affidavit, Dobson alleged that he interviewed Morgan on December 5, 1978, and credits Morgan with having furnished certain details of Cobb's involvement in the marijuana conspiracy prior to July 1978.

In April 1983, several months after the conclusion of trial and while this appeal was pending, the defendants located Rayburn Morgan, and obtained his affidavit. Morgan stated that he did not make "many" of the statements attributed to him in the Dobson affidavit, and listed those statements with which he took issue. He added that he had reason to believe Cobb intended to kill him, for which reason he had been in

hiding since the spring of 1978, and had made himself unavailable to all but the government prosecutors.

On the basis of this newly discovered evidence, appellants insist that the Dobson affidavit failed to establish the probable cause needed to authorize a wiretap on Cobb's phone. Consequently, appellants continue, this court should remand the case to the district court, presumably for a determination of whether a new trial is in order.

Evidence discovered post-trial, calling into question the existence of probable cause for a search conducted by law enforcement officers, is properly considered by the district court in a motion for a new trial pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.Pro. 33. *See, e.g., United States v. VanMaanen*, 547 F.2d 50, 52-53 (8th Cir.1976). Rule 33 provides, however, that where, as here, such a motion is filed with the district court during the pendency of an appeal, the motion may be denied but may not be granted without first having the case remanded by the court of appeals. *United States v. Fuentes-Lozano*, 580 F.2d 724 (5th Cir.1978); *see generally* C. Wright, *Federal Practice and Procedure* § 557 (1982).

For our part, a court of appeals is without authority to rule on a motion for a new trial. *United States v. Boberg*, 565 F.2d 1059, 1062 (8th Cir.1977). We must nevertheless decide whether to remand the case for the limited purpose of having the district court entertain such a motion, and if remanding the case would serve no valid purpose, we will decline to do so. *United States v. Mack*, 695 F.2d 820, 823 (5th Cir.1983).

For the appellants to prevail in the district court on a motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence, they must demonstrate, among other things, that the new evidence is such that it will probably produce an acquittal. *Bentley v. United States*, 701 F.2d 897 (11th Cir.1983); *United States v. Hirst*, 668 F.2d 1180, 1185 (11th Cir.1982). In order for such a result to be likely in this case, appellants must demonstrate, at the very least, that suppression of the wiretap evidence was warranted in light of information

contained in Morgan's affidavit. Because we do not believe that the affidavit alone could properly result in suppression of the wiretap, it is unnecessary to remand the question to the district court for its consideration.

In *Franks v. Delaware*, the Supreme Court summarized the standard applicable for determining whether a defendant is entitled to a hearing upon his allegation that a search warrant was issued on the basis of a false affidavit:

> There is, of course, a presumption of validity with respect to the affidavit supporting the search warrant. To mandate an evidentiary hearing, the challenger's attack must be more than conclusory and must be supported by more than a mere desire to cross-examine. There must be allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth, and those allegations must be accompanied by an offer of proof. They should point out specifically the portion of the warrant affidavit that is claimed to be false; and they should be accompanied by a statement of supporting reasons. Affidavits or sworn or otherwise reliable statements of witnesses should be furnished, or their absence satisfactorily explained. Allegations of negligence or innocent mistake are insufficient. The deliberate falsity or reckless disregard whose impeachment is permitted today is only that of the affiant, not of any non-governmental informant. Finally, *if these requirements are met, and if, when material that is the subject of the alleged falsity or reckless disregard is set to one side, there remains sufficient content in the warrant affidavit to support a finding of probable cause, no hearing is required.* On the other hand, if the remaining content is insufficient, the defendant is entitled, under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, to his hearing.

438 U.S. 154, 171-72, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 2684-85, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978) (footnote omitted) (emphasis supplied).

Assuming without deciding that Morgan's affidavit supports a claim of deliberate falsehood, and setting aside all reference in Dobson's affidavit to the Morgan interview (which would be unnecessary even if everything in Morgan's affidavit was taken as true, given that Morgan makes it clear, at least by implication, that he does not question all statements attributed to him), the information remaining would still be sufficient to sustain a probable cause determination. In support of his application for wiretap, Agent Dobson furnished forty-six pieces of information tending to link Bill Cobb to an ongoing marijuana conspiracy. Of those forty-six items, only seven had any connection to Rayburn Morgan. The remaining thirty-nine detail the circumstantial evidence amassed pointing to the conclusion that Cobb was deeply involved in a drug conspiracy: a pattern of telephone calls to and from Cobb's residence to other suspected co-conspirators at times when marijuana smuggling ventures were coming to fruition; Cobb's purchase, ownership or use of several items of real and personal property employed by suspected co-conspirators to house and transport themselves and their marijuana; and details of an ongoing drug investigation in Maryland involving Cobb, among others, culminating in an arrest of several of the participants.

While no one item of information recounted above might have been sufficient standing alone to justify a wiretap order, taken together, they amply set out probable cause to believe that Cobb was involved in a marijuana conspiracy. Because probable cause to issue the wiretap order existed irrespective of information allegedly obtained from Morgan, the statements credited to Morgan, whether true or false, could not alter the trial court's determination that probable cause existed to authorize a wiretap. We therefore find it unnecessary to remand the question to the lower court for an evidentiary hearing.

2. The initial wiretap application and the staleness of information supporting probable cause

The appellants' second objection to the wiretap is that the application for authorization was supported by stale information. It is their contention that even if Dobson's affidavit amply demonstrated Cobb's involvement in the conspiracy through June of 1978, it failed to provide probable cause to believe that he continued to be involved when the wiretap was authorized seven months later.

Information contained in Dobson's affidavit relating to Cobb's involvement in the conspiracy after June, 1978, is as follows: The affidavit indicated that from July through November 1978 a consistent pattern of telephone calls continued to be made from Cobb's telephones to persons previously linked to the conspiracy. In that time, Cobb changed his principal residence and telephone numbers several times, which Dobson indicated in his experience was a common practice of persons engaged in illegal operations, done in an effort to impede detection by law enforcement personnel. Finally, on November 24, a slip of paper was found in the pocket of one James Posey, at the time of his arrest in connection with a smuggling operation linked to the conspiracy previously connected to Cobb, on which was written Cobb's telephone number, and the message: "Bill called—emergency 1:30 (expletive deleted) panic."

It remains a fundamental principal of search and seizure law that information furnished in an application for a search warrant must be timely, and that probable cause must be found to exist "at the time the warrant issues." *United States v. Hyde*, 574 F.2d 856, 864 (5th Cir.1978). A warrant application based upon stale information of previous misconduct is insufficient, because it fails to create probable cause that similar or other improper conduct is continuing to occur. *United States v. Weinrich*, 586 F.2d 481, 491 (5th Cir. 1978).

No mechanical test exists for determining when information becomes fatally stale; rather, "staleness is an issue

which must be decided on the peculiar facts of each case." *Hyde*, 574 F.2d at 865; *Weinrich*, 586 F.2d at 491.

> In general, the basic criterion as to the duration of probable cause is the inherent nature of the crime. The circuits hold that where an affidavit recites a mere isolated violation then it is not unreasonable to believe that probable cause quickly dwindles with the passage of time. On the other hand, if an affidavit recites activity indicating protracted or continuous conduct, time is of less significance.

Bastida v. Henderson, 487 F.2d 860, 864 (5th Cir.1973). Protracted and continuous activity is inherent in large-scale drug trafficking operations. *United States v. Tehfe*, 722 F.2d 1114, 1119 (3d Cir.1983). In such cases, then, the staleness issue should be construed liberally. *Id.* at 1120.

In light of the liberal treatment properly accorded the staleness issue in a large drug conspiracy operation such as this, evidence of Cobb's continued complicity in the marijuana conspiracy in the seven months preceding the application was sufficient to support a finding of probable cause to authorize the wiretap. While the telephone message from Cobb found in Posey's pocket, the calls made from Cobb's telephones, and changes in Cobb's address and telephone numbers are subject to an innocent interpretation when viewed in isolation, in light of the ongoing investigation and Cobb's preexisting involvement with the conspiracy, such additional circumstantial evidence lent adequate basis for a probable cause determination that Cobb remained a part of the conspiracy and that his telephone was being used in connection with that conspiracy at the time the wiretap application was submitted. *United States v. Todisco*, 667 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir.1981).

3. The amended wiretap application and its sufficiency under federal and state law

The appellants' final objection to the wiretap concerns the sufficiency of the January 15 and 29 applications for amendment of the January 5 authorization order. They argue that the amendment applications violated Florida law, in that they improperly incorporated by reference documents relating back to the original January 5 application.[11]

Before the January 5 order had been acted upon and the wiretap was in place, Cobb had one of his telephone numbers changed. Consequently, on January 15, Dobson returned to the circuit judge who had issued the original order, and applied for an amended order reflecting the new telephone number. In his affidavit in support of the application for amendment, Dobson attached a copy of the original wiretap order, incorporated it by specific reference, and explained why that order needed to be amended. The court thereupon issued the amended order. A nearly identical sequence of events occurred later in the month; Cobb had the number on his second telephone changed, Dobson returned to court on January 29 with an application to amend the January 5 order, and the court amended its order accordingly.

The first question to be answered is whether federal or state law governs a federal district court's ruling in a federal drug conspiracy case on the sufficiency of a wiretap application approved by a state court and submitted by a state law enforcement agent. Both the United States and the state of Florida have enacted wiretap authorization statutes. *See* 18

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[11] To the extent that the amendment application cannot "piggyback" on the original, appellants make the related argument that the amendment was not properly authorized, in that only the original was officially approved by an appropriate state official.

U.S.C. § 2510 *et seq.*; FSA §§ 934.01 *et seq.* Title 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2) provides in pertinent part:

> The principal prosecuting attorney of any State, or the principal prosecuting attorney of any political subdivision thereof, if such attorney is authorized by a statute of that State to make application to a State court judge of competent jurisdiction for an order authorizing or approving the interception of wire or oral communications, may apply to such judge for, and such judge may grant in conformity with section 2518 of this chapter *and with the applicable State statute* an order authorizing, or approving the interception of wire or oral communications by investigative or law enforcement officers having responsibility for the investigation of the offense as to which the application is made . . .

(emphasis supplied). Two courts of appeals have expressly held that the federal statute requires federal courts to defer to state law on the question of the validity of wiretap orders obtained in state court by state law enforcement agents, to the extent that state requirements are the more rigorous. *United States v. McNulty*, 729 F.2d 1243, 1264 (10th Cir.1984) (en banc); *United States v. Marion*, 535 F.2d 697 (2d Cir.1976). In *United States v. Nelligan*, our court tacitly approved "the Second Circuit's conclusion that state law governs the validity of state warrants issued by state courts" as an exception to "the general rule that federal law governs the admissibility of wiretap evidence in federal criminal cases." 573 F.2d 251, 254 (5th Cir.1978). We agree with the interpretation given the statute by our brethren in the Second and Tenth Circuits, and therefore make explicit what was only implicit in *Nelligan:* that the requirements of state and federal law govern a federal district court's determination of the validity of wiretap warrants obtained by state law enforcement officers in state courts.

As previously noted, the state circuit court approved Agent Dobson's applications to amend the original January 5 wiretap authorization order, on the basis of affidavits that

incorporated by reference the January 5 order and stated that an amendment to that order was necessary because the subject of the wiretap had changed his telephone number. The appellants do not suggest that this procedure would run afoul of federal law, but contend that it did violate the more rigorous Florida requirements. In support of their position, appellants have brought to our attention two Florida court of appeals decisions applying the state wiretap statute, and invalidating wiretap order amendment applications that incorporated by reference documents from the original application. *Bagley v. State*, 397 So.2d 1036 (Fla.App. 1981); *Wilson v. State*, 377 So.2d 237 (Fla.App. 1979).

In both *Wilson* and *Bagley*, the original wiretap applications submitted by the state were sufficient in all respects and were properly approved. Among the requirements satisfied, was that the applicant furnish "a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous"—a requirement common to the Florida and federal statutes. § 934.09(1)(c), Fla.Stats.; 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c). Before the thirty-day time period on the original orders had run, the subjects of the wiretaps in *Bagley* and *Wilson* changed residence and telephone number, forcing the state to return to court with applications to amend the existing orders. In neither amendment application did the state reassert that other investigative procedures continued to be too dangerous or unlikely to succeed. Rather, they simply incorporated by reference statements to that effect from the original application.

The Florida courts of appeals held that the amendment applications were insufficient. The rationale for that conclusion, implicit in both opinions, is that when a suspect changes residence, the circumstances that previously made other investigative procedures dangerous or unlikely to succeed may no longer exist, thus requiring the state to assert new facts in its amendment application demonstrating that

conventional investigative techniques continue to be dangerous or ineffective. As the *Bagley* court observed: "In the original application for wiretap, the affiant declared that it was difficult to surveil Bagley's residence because there were no positions the affiant could sit without being detected. The amendment makes no reference at all to the success or failure of the surveillance techniques employed at the new location. The amendment also fails to state why routine methods of surveillance could not be used at the new location." 397 So.2d. at 1038.

Unlike the subjects of the wiretaps in *Bagley* and *Wilson*, Cobb changed only his telephone number. As distinguished from a change in residence, a change in telephone number only could not conceivably have affected the efficacy of alternative investigative techniques. Nor in the context of this case could such a change call into question the continued existence of probable cause—to the contrary, in his initial application, Agent Dobson pointed to Cobb's frequent changes in telephone number as evidence of his continued involvment in illicit activities.

The foregoing comparison of *Bagley* and *Wilson* to the instant case leads us to conclude that Dobson's amendment applications were sufficient under Florida law. The naked formality of restating information in the amendment that would, in the context of this case, necessarily be identical in every respect to that presented one or two weeks before to the same circuit judge in the original application was not indispensable.

B. The Indictment

Count V of the indictment provided in its entirety:

COUNT FIVE

The Grand Jury further charges that:

> Commencing during January, 1977 and continuing thereafter up to and including the date of the filing of

> this indictment, within the Northern District of Florida, and elsewhere, MANUEL ERIC VILLANUEVA, JOSE LUIS ACOSTA, MANUEL W. JAMES, GUSTAVO J. FERNANDEZ, CLIFFORD B. WENTWORTH, CARLTON C. REEVES, JAMES L. SELLERS, JOHN M. ARANEO, PATRICK C. WALDROP, RUSSELL HOBSON, and RENE BENITEZ, defendants herein, did unlawfully, willfully and knowingly conspire, combine, confederate and agree together, with each other and with divers other persons known and unknown to the Grand Jury, to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute marihuana, a Schedule I controlled substance in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 841(a), all in violation of Title 21 United States Code, Section 846.

The appellants' objection is that in the absence of more detailed factual allegations, Count V was constitutionally insufficient in that it failed to put the defendants on notice of the events giving rise to the crime charged. Along similar lines, the appellants complain that they had previously been tried with respect to the incidents forming the basis for the charge, but that the indictment was so unspecific that they were unable to formulate a coherent objection on double jeopardy gounds.

Defendants' contentions need not detain us long. In *United States v. Yonn*, our court conclusively resolved this very issue adversely to appellants:

> To pass constitutional muster, an indictment must be sufficiently specific to inform the defendant of the charge against him and to enable him to plead double jeopardy in any future prosecutions for the same offense. (citation omitted). Those requirements are satisfied by an indictment that tracks the wording of the statute, as long as the language sets forth the essential elements of the crime. (citations omitted). In addition, "an indictment for conspiracy to commit a criminal offense need

not be as specific as a substantive count." (citation omitted).

Against this background, the indictment here meets the test of specificity. Count II recites the essential elements of the offense charged against Sanes-Saavedra—knowingly conspiring to import a schedule I controlled substance into the United States, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a) and 963. It identified his alleged coconspirators as well as the particular controlled substance. (citation omitted). The indictment also correctly set forth the time span of the conspiracy: from June 1, 1981 until the date of the indictment (November 24, 1981). (citations omitted). It further described the locale of the alleged conspiracy, at least partially, with the allegation that the criminal activity took place "in the Northern District of Florida and elsewhere." Taken as a whole, these allegations adequately set forth the offense charged.

702 F.2d 1341, 1348 (11th Cir.1983).

C. Impaneling of the Jury

1. The peremptory strike procedure

At the pretrial conference, the district court gave counsel for appellants a choice in the exercise of their peremptory challenges. Either they could exercise three challenges apiece without conferring among themselves prior to announcing the strikes each intended to make (for a maximum total of eighteen challenges, or a minimum of three, depending upon the extent to which the strikes overlapped), or they could collectively exercise fifteen strikes after consultation. Appellants chose the latter option and now contend that because the collective decision making process required lawyers-only conferences and decision making outside the earshot of their clients, the appellants were denied their right to be represented by counsel and to be present at a critical stage in the proceedings.

Rules 43 and 44 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure embody a criminal defendant's rights under the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution to be present and to be represented by counsel at every stage of the proceedings against him, including the impaneling of the jury. Fed.R.Crim.P. 43(a), 44(a); *Illinois v. Allen*, 397 U.S. 337, 338, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1058, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970); *United States v. Chrisco*, 493 F.2d 232 (8th Cir.1974). Those rights necessarily extend to that phase of the jury selection process involving the exercise of peremptory strikes. *Chrisco*, 493 F.2d at 236-37.

Rule 24(b) outlines the appropriate procedures for exercise of peremptory challenges:

> If the offense charged is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, the government is entitled to 6 peremptory challenges and the defendant or defendants jointly to 10 peremptory challenges...If there is more than one defendant, the court may allow the defendants additional peremptory challenges and permit them to be exercised separately or jointly.

Fed.R.Crim.Pro. 24(b). The procedure utilized in the appellants' trial comported with Rule 24: the defendants were permitted jointly to exercise fifteen peremptory strikes—ten as a matter of right under the rule, and an additional five in the discretion of the trial court because there was more than one defendant involved. Appellants do not dispute this, but argue nevertheless that because the lawyers conferred among themselves outside the courtroom before exercising their peremptory strikes, their clients were simultaneously denied access to counsel and their right to be present.

We disagree. Nothing in the record suggests that counsel were rendered unable to confer with their clients in the course of the peremptory strike process. At the pretrial conference, the court told counsel that "I will give you an opportunity to confer among yourselves back in the back outside the hearing of everybody before you have to exercise your peremptory challenges," and at the voir dire, counsel

took advantage of that opportunity. Nothing prevented counsel from speaking with their clients after they had conferred informally among themselves, before they made their strikes. Under these circumstances, we are unable to conclude that the appellants were deprived of their right to counsel. *United States v. Alessandrello*, 637 F.2d 131, 144 (3d Cir.1980); *Chrisco*, 493 F.2d at 237.

We likewise hold that the defendants were not denied their right to be present during the peremptory strike phase of jury selection. This case is quite close on its facts to the Eighth Circuit's decision in *United States v. Chrisco*, 493 F.2d 232 (8th Cir.1974). In *Chrisco*, the defendants were absent from the courtroom when their counsel informally conferred and made their peremptory strikes (a situation somewhat more troubling than in the instant case, where the defendants were in the courtroom at all times, and counsel left briefly to confer). The *Chrisco* court nevertheless held that the defendants had not been denied their right to be present for the peremptory strike phase of the jury selection process, in light of the following facts: the defendants were in the courtroom when the voir dire questioning took place and again when the peremptory strikes were given actual effect by the clerk's reading off the list; the defendants had the opportunity to discuss their misgivings with counsel during or immediately following the impaneling process; and no objection was made at the time to the defendants' absence from the informal peremptory strike conference. For the same reasons, we conclude that the defendants were sufficiently present at the impaneling of the jury to satisfy the sixth amendment and Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

2. Sufficiency of the voir dire inquiry

The appellants' second attack upon the jury selection procedures employed in this case is directed at what they perceive to be an impermissibly brief and superficial voir dire examination conducted by the trial court. At the pretrial conference, the district judge informed counsel that he intended to conduct the voir dire himself, that counsel could

submit questions they wanted asked, and that the court in turn would determine which questions were appropriate. (v. 29 at 16-17). Waldrop and Fernandez subsequently submitted lists containing 71 and 58 questions, respectively. (v. 9 at 2109-2112; 2173-2176). At the voir dire, the court posed twelve questions to the jurors, most if not all of which were among those requested by the defendants.[12] The appellants contend that the limited number of questions asked by the court precluded the defendants from rationally exercising their jury strikes, both peremptory and for cause.

Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that:

> The court may permit the defendant or his attorney and the attorney for the government to conduct the examination of prospective jurors or it may itself conduct the examination. In the latter event, the court shall permit the defendant or his attorney and the attorney for the government to supplement the examination by such further inquiry as it deems proper or shall itself submit to the prospective jurors such additional questions by the parties or their attorneys as it deems proper.

In granting the district court latitude to ask or have asked such questions "as it deems proper," Rule 24 vests considerable discretion in the court to determine the appropriate method and scope of voir dire. *United States v. Brunty*, 701 F.2d 1375, 1378 (11th Cir.1983). That discretion, however, is not boundless:

> We do not deem "as it deems proper" to give a trial judge unlimited discretion to ignore proposed questions nor to permit arbitrary refusal to put such questions.
>
> We do not consider the court's obligation to let counsel, on request, get at underlying bases reflecting on bias,

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[12] It should be added that a number of the proposed questions seeking general background information respecting the individual jurors were answered by means of questionnaires filled out and returned by the venire.

> prejudice or other suspect factors to be discharged by general questions such as, "Is there any reason you cannot fairly and impartially try this case?" This obligation particularly would not seem to be discharged by general direct confrontation questions on human characteristics that most people are reluctant to admit they possess.
>
> On the other hand, we do not mean to suggest that the same matter may be explored in numerous substantially similar questions, with tedious repetitions, of only slightly variant shadings of meaning. No hard and fast rules can be laid down, but the trial court within the general guidelines hereinbefore set forth must exercise its discretion so as not to block the reasonable exploration of germane factors that might expose a basis for challenge, whether for cause or peremptory.

United States v. Lewin, 467 F.2d 1132, 1138 (7th Cir.1972); *see also United States v. Nell*, 526 F.2d 1223, 1229-30 (5th Cir. 1976). *Accord United States v. Ledee*, 549 F.2d 990, 993 (5th Cir. 1977) ("Peremptory strikes are worthless if counsel is not afforded an opportunity to gain the necessary information upon which to base such strikes").

The appellants charge that the defendants were rendered unable to exercise rationally their jury strikes, because of the trial court's failure to pursue two crucial avenues of inquiry: juror bias toward marijuana, and juror prejudgment due to the enormous quantity of marijuana involved in this case. Contrary to the appellants' suggestion, the district court did inquire into juror bias toward marijuana, as follows:

> THE COURT: All right. Now, as I have previously indicated to you, this case involves the alleged importation of marijuana. Marijuana and drug laws in this day and age are somewhat of a controversy. There are those individuals who think that the drug laws are too strictly enforced. There are also those individuals that think the drug laws are not strictly enough enforced.

> Now, without asking whether you have any opinions concerning the drug laws, are there any of you that feel that, whatever your opinions may be, that it would influence your conduct in acting as a fair and impartial jury just because this is a drug case? Does everybody understand what I mean?
>
> Are there any of you that feel so strongly about the drug laws that you do not feel that you could base your verdict solely on the evidence, the argument of counsel, and the charge that I will give at the conclusion as to the law that you must follow?

(v. 30 at 54-55).

In response to that question, one juror indicated that he "was going to try" to base his verdict solely on the evidence, but that it would be "a hard decision," because he dislikes drugs "mighty hard." (v. 30 at 55-56). While no challenge for cause followed, the juror was subsequently removed by means of a peremptory strike. (v. 30 at 68). We are satisfied that the trial court's inquiry into the juror's bias toward marijuana offenses was sufficient to create "a reasonable assurance that prejudice would be discovered if present." *United States v. Nell*, 526 F.2d 1223, 1229 (5th Cir.1976).

Appellants further challenge the sufficiency of the voir dire because of the trial court's failure to inquire into potential juror prejudice against the defendants in light of the large quantity of marijuana involved. As noted earlier, during the pretrial conference the defendants were invited to submit questions for the court to ask prospective jurors; a total of 129 questions were later submitted. Not one of those proposed questions asked whether the jurors would be affected by the quantity of drugs involved in the case. We are satisfied that the general inquiry into the jurors' opinions respecting drug offenses was sufficient to disclose relevant prejudices, and that it was well within the trial court's discretion not to pursue the matter further with additional questions concerning the jurors' attitudes toward the quantity of marijuana at issue—especially in light of the fact

that the defendants never requested that such a question be posed. *United States v. Eastwood*, 489 F.2d 818, 819-20 (5th Cir. 1973) (general questions posed by the district court pertaining to juror bias sufficed for specific questions proposed by defendant but rejected by the court); *United States v. Desmarais*, 531 F.2d 632, 634 n. 4 (1st Cir.1976) (failure of defendant to request that specific questions be asked was relevant to a determination that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to ask such questions).

3. The voir dire and defendants' presumption of innocence

As a final attack on the impaneling process, appellants challenge the trial court's inquiries and admonitions concerning the purpose and effect of a grand jury indictment, as impermissibly stripping the defendants of their presumption of innocence, by suggesting that the indictment constituted a probable cause determination of guilt. Contrary to the appellants' claims, when the two questions and comments complained of are placed in context, the trial court's discourse with veniremembers served to protect rather than to threaten the defendants' presumption of innocence.

In both instances, the remarks at issue were preceded by a question from the court inquiring into whether any of the veniremembers had previously served on a jury. Answers were given indicating that certain individuals had served on grand juries, which prompted the court to respond with a follow-up question:

> Has anybody else had any either grand jury or petty jury experience?
>
> All right. Which leads me to the statement that I make now. Do any of you realize that, of course, the indictment in this case is not evidence of guilt and it only represents a finding that there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed by someone(?) Do each of you understand that?
>
> All right. Do each of you understand that in our system the accused stands now before you innocent and

remains so until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt? Do each of you understand that?

All right. Do each of you understand that the accused need not offer any evidence, need not testify, need not say a thing and that it is on the government to prove their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt? Do each of you understand that? Do each of you agree with that principal (sic)?

(v. 30 at 52-53). And again:

THE COURT: You were on a grand jury then. Do each of you understand the difference between a grand jury and a petit jury? Do each of you understand that a grand jury makes a finding of probable cause whereas a petit jury must be convinced by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt before a conviction can be held(?)

(v. 30 at 70-71). Having evaluated the court's remarks in the context in which they arose, it is clear that the defendants' presumption of innocence and the government's burden of proof were left fully intact. *See United States v. Faulkner*, 488 F.2d 328, 330-31 (5th Cir. 1974).

III. Issues Relating to Matters Arising at Trial

A. Closing Argument

The appellants challenge the italicized portions of the following excerpt from the government's closing argument, as improperly calculated to incite the passions of the jury and prejudicial to the defendants' right to a fair trial:

By your verdict today, by your verdict today or tomorrow, whenever you render that verdict, you will be serving the cause of justice. I am going to tell you, too, whatever the outcome is in this case, justice will have been served. I want to see justice done. I don't want to see convictions for the sake of convictions. I want to see that justice is done.

You go in there, follow the instructions of the law, apply it to the evidence in the case. Then justice will have been done. Justice will have been served.

But you serve by your verdict, you serve as a conscience of this community. If you find that the government, by its evidence, has proved these defendants guilty beyond and to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt, then it's your duty to find these defendants guilty as charged. By that verdict, you will send out a very loud and clear message to other people of a similar persuasion that will traffic—

MR. HARTMAN: Judge, I object.

THE COURT: Overruled.

MR. GEEKER: *—That would traffic in marijuana of these quantities,* that would engage in this kind of illegal activities. *You have heard and you're familiar by virtue of your own common sense and experience with everyday affairs, the term, the war on drugs.*

Isn't this case really one about a war? Haven't they invaded our shores?

MR. HARTMAN: Objection.

MR. KRIEGER: Objection.

THE COURT: Well, the argument of counsel is in response to the defense lawyer's argument. The jury knows that the argument of counsel is not evidence. To that extent, they will disregard it.

MR. GEEKER: In any event, *there are tons and tons of marijuana brought into our communities here and dumped on our community.* This arena of justice, this court of law, is the place to decide whether or not this kind of activity is going to continue. Consider the evidence.

MR. DIAMOND: Continuing objection—

THE COURT: Overruled.

MR. DIAMOND: Continuing objection to that line of questioning.

THE COURT: Overruled.

MR. GEEKER: Consider your verdict based on the evidence, not what I argue. My argument is not evidence. But consider the evidence. If you consider the evidence and weigh it properly, then I am confident you will return a just verdict. Thank you.

(v. 43 at 293-95).

In order for a claim of prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument to warrant reversal, the challenged remarks must be 1) improper; and 2) prejudicial to a substantial right of the defendant. *United States v. Kopituk*, 690 F.2d 1289, 1341 (11th Cir.1982). Upon evaluating the prosecutor's closing argument in light of the foregoing criteria, we hold that the challenged statements do not constitute reversible misconduct.

The statements of the United States Attorney that are complained of in this appeal, were made in rebuttal, following the closing arguments of the defendants. Among the closing arguments, and occupying thirty pages of transcript, was a self-described "drama" performed by counsel for James and beginning as follows:

This is a criminal trial. This is a big case for the government. That's what it was, folks. I didn't lie. It was a circus right from the beginning to the bitter end.

So allow me to indulge a bit in a little drama and tell you about Operation Sunburn.

Ladies and gentlemen, welcome to the Big Top, the Greatest Show on Earth, also known as Operation Sunburn. Accompany me. The drama is in three sections. Starring Mr. Nickolas Geeker, United States Attorney, as Mr. Nick the Ringmaster. Mike Moore as Mr. Mike, the Animal Trainer, and Assistant Ringmaster, Mr.

> Ken Sukhia, as the Young Circus Boy in Training. The Friendly Mr. Ferdinand Bockelman, the Paper Man Putting Posters Out to Welcome People to the Circus. And Scott Daniels, Assistant Animal Trainer and Keeper of the Zoo.
>
> Act One. The circus comes to town. Well, Mr. Nick, we certainly have a good circus coming here. We've got a good show, got a lots of animals lined up for Mr. Mike. I got some great people some—rather, we've got them lined up. We are going to get that man on the high wire.
>
> Who is that, says the Young Circus Boy. Who is that man walking on the high wire up there?
>
> Well, this is Manny James.

Defense counsel's extended analogy of the government's conduct to a three-ring circus "was clearly an invitation to the prosecutor to protest to the contrary," *United States v. Eley*, 723 F.2d 1522, 1526 (11th Cir.1984). When the prosecutor goes no further than to take defense counsel up on his invitation, his conduct will not be regarded as impermissibly calculated to incite the passions of the jury. *Id.; see also United States v. Cotton*, 631 F.2d 63, 63-66 (5th Cir.1980). The United States Attorney's likening the drug problem to a war or enemy invasion, coupled with his statement that he was interested in justice and not convictions for their own sake, could fairly be described as little more than a response to defense counsel's suggestion that the defendants' prosecution was a show put on by government counsel for their own amusement.

Turning to the specific remarks complained of, prosecutorial appeals for the jury to act as "the conscience of the community" are not impermissible, unless calculated to inflame. *United States v. Kopituk*, 690 F.2d 1289, 1292-93; *United States v. Lewis*, 547 F.2d 1030, 1036 (8th Cir.1976); *United States v. Alloway*, 397 F.2d 105, 113 (6th Cir.1968). Nor is it impermissible "to simply compare the duties of citizens

serving on juries with those of citizens serving in the armed forces." *Brooks v. Francis*, 716 F.2d 780, 789 (11th Cir. 1983) (en banc pending). Finally, the prosecutor's reference to "tons and tons" of marijuana being "dumped" on the community was nothing more than a permissibly colorful way to describe a fact amply borne out in the record.

Because the remarks of government counsel are better understood as a response to the defendant's closing argument than as an attempt to inflame the jury, and because those remarks were not improper in and of themselves, reversal is unwarranted.

B. Ex Parte Communications Between the Judge and Jury During Deliberations

The jury commenced its deliberations at 9:50 a.m. on March 25. In the course of the day, the judge and jury exchanged several notes: (1) the jury requested an index of tapes played at trial, to which the court responded that no acceptable index existed; (2) the jury inquired as to a number of pages missing from the indictment, to which the court responded that the missing pages involved matters not relevant for the jury's consideration; (3) the jury requested transcripts of telephone conversations introduced into evidence by the prosecution and defense, to which the court responded that the jury already had transcripts of all telephone conversations introduced by the government, that some but not all of the telephone conversations introduced by the defense had been transcribed, and that to the extent the jury could not recall what it heard in the tapes that were not transcribed, it could request that any particular tape be replayed in open court; (4) the jury indicated that the tape transcripts were not in the jury room, to which the court did not respond. (v. 15 at 3455-62). The court went back on the record at 6:00 p.m., and in the presence of counsel stated:

> I think we'll start tomorrow morning afresh, assuming they're not finished. I am confident they're not. But what I thought I would do is just send a note to them

> and ask them if they have arrived at any complete verdicts as to any defendants. Then find out yes or no. And then tell the marshal to bring them into the courtroom and bring with them only those verdicts, if any that they have arrived at as to any of the defendants. Is that fair enough?

(v. 44 at 68). Notwithstanding the concern of a number of defendants that such a note might be interpreted as coercive, the court sent the following message to the jury room: "Have you arrived at a unanimous verdict as to any defendant which you wish to report to me? Yes or no," to which the jury responded, "No, sir." The record reflects that the jury was returned to the courtroom at 6:11 p.m., at which time the court stated:

> Members of the jury, I passed the note to you asking you whether you had reached a unanimous verdict as to any defendant, for the sole purpose of trying to give me some idea of how you were coming in your deliberations. I don't suggest that you should have reached a unanimous verdict as to any defendant. It occurs to me you have been here now over ten hours and you have had to digest a lot of things. And it further occurs to me that you probably won't be able to reach a verdict tonight as to any or all of the defendants. And consequently, I am going to discharge you to the custody of the marshals for the remainder of the evening.

(v. 44 at 71-72).

After the jury had been excused, the court stated as follows:

> While we are on the record and the jury is gone, have all counsel seen the notes that the jury has, the questions they have asked and the answers given?...I didn't see any need in calling counsel on the questions that were asked. The main problem was, they couldn't find a piece—or some evidence. And the transcripts of the tapes.

(v. 44 at 72-73). Counsel for appellant James indicated affirmatively on the record that he had read the notes, and it can be assumed by the silence of the remaining counsel, who were present, that they had likewise read the notes. No objections were made at that time.

On March 26, two notes were sent from the jury to the court: one indicating that a verdict had been reached as to four of the six defendants, and the second stating that the jury was hung with respect to one defendant. At 4:45 that afternoon, the court went on the record to say that it had received the note indicating that the jury was hung, and proposed that an *Allen* charge, the so-called "dynamite charge," be given. Over objection, the jury was returned to the courtroom at 4:51, and the *Allen* charge was read. The verdict was returned approximately an hour after the jury had been returned to the jury room and recommenced deliberations.

With respect to the court's inquiry into whether the jury had reached a partial verdict as of the evening of the 25th, we find that no error was committed. The record clearly indicates that the communication was not undertaken until after counsel had been notified and had been given the opportunity to object. *United States v. McDuffie*, 542 F.2d 236, 241 (5th Cir.1976). Moreover, any coercive or otherwise improper impact the note might conceivably have had, was neutralized by the court's later remarks when the jury was returned to the courtroom.

The other communications undertaken on the 25th are somewhat more troubling. It is certainly true that preferable procedure would have been for the court to have informed counsel of communications from the jury and to afford them an opportunity to be heard before written responses were returned. *United States v. McDuffie*, 542 F.2d 236, 241 (5th Cir.1976). Nevertheless, counsel's failure to object to the ex parte communications at the time they were revealed may have operated as a waiver. Moreover, courts have universally held that where wholly innocuous inquires of the sort

at issue here are responded to by the court without first consulting counsel, any error thereby committed is non-prejudicial. *United States v. Reynolds*, 489 F.2d 4, 7-8 (6th Cir. 1973); *United States v. Stone*, 452 F.2d 42, 48-49 (8th Cir.1971); *United States v. Goodman*, 457 F.2d 68, 72-73 (9th Cir.1972); *United States v. Freed*, 460 F.2d 75, 78-79 (10th Cir.1972). As the Fifth Circuit noted in *United States v. Breedlove*, 576 F.2d 57, 60 (5th Cir.1978), "when the judge's answer to the jury's inquiry was distinctly responsive to the question, it clearly stated the law, and no prejudice is shown, the error is harmless." *See also United States v. McDuffie*, 542 F.2d 236, 241 (5th Cir.1976). In this case, the court's answers were distinctly responsive to the jury's questions, and as such were at most harmless error.[13]

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[13] Counsel for Villanueva and Fernandez make reference to a note submitted by the jury to the court on the 26th stating: "We would like to go home and come back tomorrow." (v. 15 at 3467). In their brief, Villanueva and Fernandez assert that this note was submitted to the court without the knowledge of defense counsel before the *Allen* charge had been given and before a verdict had been reached. They argue that the effect of the *Allen* charge urging the jury to attempt to resolve their differences and reach a verdict, when the jury had expressed a desire to go home, was impermissibly coercive, but that because counsel were unaware of the jury communication, no objection was possible.

This argument is premised upon a blatant misreading of the record. The jury returned its verdict at 6:10 p.m. on March 26. (v. 44 at 80-88). At that point, the court informed the jury that it still had to decide whether certain pieces of defendants' property were to be forfeited to the government. On the record and in open court, the judge gave the jury the option of continuing on into the evening or returning in the morning, and the jury responded by way of a note, that again was read in open court and on the record, saying that they would prefer to recess and return in the morning. (v. 44 at 88-89). Since the communication appellants complain of occurred with their knowledge, after the *Allen* charge had been read and the verdicts announced, and without objection, the appellants' argument is patently frivolous.

Separate Issues

I. Villanueva and Fernandez

A. The interview of Fernandez by a United States Attorney outside the presence of Fernandez's counsel.

Prior to trial, with the knowledge and assent of Fernandez's attorney, a United States Attorney offered not to oppose Fernandez's motion to reduce bond, in return for the opportunity to speak with Fernandez privately, outside the presence of his counsel. Fernandez agreed. The government's objective was to investigate what was suspected to be the improper representation of Fernandez and James by their principal attorney, a suspicion subsequently confirmed, resulting in disqualification of the lawyer involved.

On the basis of this incident, Fernandez moved the district court to dismiss the indictment. The district court ruled that the communication was improper, but could be remedied by means less extreme than dismissal:

> Assuming the United States Attorney's behavior amounted to misconduct, the "remedies should be tailored to the injury suffered. . . ." *United States v. Morrison*, [449 U.S. 361, 364, 101 S.Ct. 665, 668], 66 L.Ed.2d 564, 568 (1981). . . . Fernandez complain(s) of two injuries. One is that the United States Attorney's actions poisoned their relationship with their lawyer. That complaint is mooted by their lawyer's disqualification. The other is that through his conversations with them the United States Attorney gained evidence and leads to even more evidence. The United States Attorney quite properly states he does not intend to introduce in his case in chief any evidence given him in the meetings and that the conversations were not used to obtain evidence. Even if, as defendants allege, evidence were procured through the conversations, the prejudice can be cured by suppression of the evidence.

On appeal, Fernandez acknowledges that the Supreme Court's unanimous decision in *United States v. Morrison* explicitly held that absent demonstrable prejudice, dismissal of an indictment for violation of a defendant's sixth amendment rights is unnecessary. 101 S.Ct. 665, 449 U.S. 361, 66 L.Ed.2d 564 (1981). Inexplicably, however, Fernandez does not challenge the district court's conclusion that the potential for prejudice could be eliminated by means stopping short of dismissal, but instead is content to argue that the government's conduct requires per se dismissal. In effect, the appellant invites us to overrule Supreme Court precedent. We decline.

The agreement negotiated by the United States Attorney, wherein Fernandez was to barter his right to counsel in return for his freedom, constituted a coerced rather than voluntary waiver of the appellant's sixth amendment rights, and as such was wholly improper. *See Brewer v. Williams*, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977). Nevertheless, we are in complete agreement with the district court that suppression of information obtained from Fernandez in defense counsel's absence assured that the government's misconduct would not prejudice the appellant in any way. Fernandez is unable to point to any evidence admitted at trial that was secured as a result of the improper interview. Accordingly, we affirm its ruling.

B. The sufficiency of the evidence supporting Villanueva's continuing criminal enterprise conviction.

Under 21 U.S.C. § 848, a person who engages in a continuing criminal enterprise shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of ten years to life. A person is considered to have engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise if he violates any provision of 21 U.S.C. §§ 801 *et seq.* governing drug abuse prevention and control, in the course of a continuing series of like violations undertaken in concert with five or more other persons "with respect to whom such person occupies a position of organizer, a supervisory position, or any other position of management," as a result of which that

person obtains substantial income or resources. Villanueva challenges his conviction under this statute, on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that he was an organizer or supervisor of the enterprise. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the government, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Villanueva's conviction.

Evidence supporting Villanueva's continuing criminal enterprise conviction came largely from the testimony of two of Villanueva's former co-conspirators: Bill Cobb and Dan Abbey. Cobb testified that from the time of his first involvement in the conspiracy, Acosta, Bascaro, and Villaneuva were the ones principally responsible for bringing marijuana into the United States. Cobb testified that Villaneuva was involved in overseeing the purchase of suitable vessels, was present at storage sites when marijuana arrived, and participated in planning meetings. Cobb further testified that Villanueva furnished the money to purchase the properties where marijuana was stashed (v. 38 at 152-63); Villanueva together with Acosta were responsible for approving the sites where marijuana was to be offloaded (v. 38 at 183); and the enterprise deferred to Villanueva's judgment as to when the offloading was to occur (v. 38 at 195).

Abbey testified that the standard operating procedure of the enterprise was for him to collect the proceeds from various drug sales and turn them over to Villanueva and Acosta. (v. 40 at 15-17; 48-49; 57). Abbey further indicated that Villanueva was one of several members of the organization who would prepare the weight sheets, records reflecting the quantity of marijuana transferred to particular buyers. Weight sheets were reproduced in triplicate, and upon completion of a sale, one copy would go to the buyer, another would be retained by Abbey, and a third would be returned to either Acosta or Villanueva. (v. 40 at 42-44). At the conclusion of his direct examination, Abbey was asked to describe the various roles of the individuals about whom he had testified. He responded, without objection from defense

counsel, that Villanueva "was in charge of the complete operation initially." (v. 40 at 65-66).

The foregoing testimony furnishes an adequate basis for the conclusion that Villanueva occupied a supervisory role in the conspiracy. Certainly the most conclusive evidence of this fact is Abbey's testimony that Villanueva was "in charge of the complete operation," and again that he was "the top man." (v. 40 at 65-94). Such conclusions were amply supported by Abbey's previous testimony concerning Villanueva's financial control of the enterprise. *United States v. Johnson*, 575 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1978).

C. Double jeopardy and Villanueva's convictions for both continuing criminal enterprise and underlying conspiracy counts.

In affirming Villanueva's continuing criminal enterprise conviction, we must simultaneously vacate his convictions on counts three and five for conspiracy to import and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana, on double jeopardy grounds. The conspiracy provisions of the Controlled Substances and Controlled Substances Import and Export Acts proscribe conspiracy to commit any of the offenses defined in those acts. 21 U.S.C. §§ 846; 963. Similarly, the crime of continuing criminal enterprise, as defined in the Controlled Substances Act and construed by the Supreme Court in *Jeffers v. United States*, 432 U.S. 137, 97 S.Ct. 2207, 53 L.Ed.2d 168 (1977), includes as one of its elements a conspiracy to violate the provisions of the Controlled Substances or Controlled Substances Import and Export Acts. 21 U.S.C. § 848(b). In other words, one cannot be guilty of continuing criminal enterprise without also being guilty of conspiracy—the latter is a lesser included offense of the former. *Jeffers*; *United States v. Michel*, 588 F.2d 986, 1001 (5th Cir. 1979); *United States v. Graziano*, 710 F.2d 691, 699 (11th Cir. 1983). Where, as here, a defendant is convicted of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise as well as the lesser included offenses of conspiracy to import and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana, the

proper remedy is to vacate both the convictions and sentences of the lesser included conspiracy offenses. *Graziano*, 710 F.2d at 699.

II. Hobson and Waldrop

Appellants Hobson and Waldrop argue that the evidence was insufficient to sustain any of their several convictions. Both Hobson and Waldrop were convicted of conspiracy and substantive offenses under the RICO statute, conspiracy to import and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance, and possessing with intent to distribute and importing a controlled substance.

Hobson and Waldrop might best be described as preferred customers of the enterprise. They were marijuana buyers (v. 40 at 66), Waldrop was described as one of the organization's "best buyers" (v. 40 at 55), and it was estimated that the two of them had purchased marijuana from the organization on 25 or 30 occasions (v. 40 at 62). The closeness of the working relationship between Hobson, Waldrop, and the other members of the enterprise is evidenced by numerous instances of mutual accommodation. Waldrop was relieved of his obligation to pay for 750 pounds of marijuana that Waldrop claimed was bad (v. 40 at 25), Waldrop and Hobson advanced money to the other members of the enterprise as a deposit on an incoming marijuana shipment (v. 38 at 187, 220-22), and at Hobson's instigation, a second attempt was made to import marijuana by plane following the failure of an initial attempt (v. 38 at 222-23).

Hobson and Waldrop's convictions arose out of their involvement in two smuggling ventures: the "Tallahassee warehouse" and "Constellation" episodes. The Tallahassee warehouse episode involved Waldrop but not Hobson. In April 1978, a warehouse in Tallahassee, Florida was leased in anticipation of the arrival of a double load, or 80,000 pounds, of marijuana. The load arrived in late April, of which 40,000 pounds was set aside for Waldrop; for reasons that were never explained, however, Waldrop was late in

picking the load up. (v. 40 at 52-53). On April 26, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement discovered the stash, and were at the warehouse conducting an investigation when Waldrop arrived in a rented car. (v. 31 at 85-90). Waldrop was stopped and questioned, and a consensual search of his briefcase yielded records of marijuana transactions. The records were seized, but Waldrop was released at that time. (v. 31 at 89-90).

The Constellation episode involved both Hobson and Waldrop. In January 1979, Cobb, together with Waldrop and Hobson, made arrangements for the delivery of a planeload of marijuana. (v. 38 at 186-87). Appellant James advised Cobb against embarking upon this particular venture, but agreed to stand by and provide Cobb with legal assistance if necessary. (v. 38 at 187-88). Waldrop made a down payment of $1,500,000 with the expectation that he and Hobson would receive the entire planeload of marijuana. (v. 34 at 165; v. 38 at 167; v. 40 at 55). The plan failed, however, when the plane was seized upon its arrival at the Ft. Lauderdale airport. Appellant James was called in to represent the parties arrested (v. 38 at 188), and Acosta interposed himself between Cobb and the Colombian sellers, who were blaming Cobb for the venture's failure (v. 39 at 118-19).

Waldrop and Hobson requested that Cobb either attempt a second airplane smuggling venture, or return their security deposit; Cobb agreed to a second attempt on the condition that Waldrop and Hobson purchase most if not all of the shipment. (v. 38 at 221-23). In February 1979, a Constellation aircraft was flown to Colombia, and loaded with marijuana. Because of fog and engine problems, the craft was compelled to land in Panama City in lieu of the more clandestine site agreed upon, and federal agents were ready and waiting upon its arrival. (v. 32 at 132-40; 161-66).

A. Conspiracy to Import and Conspiracy to Possess with Intent to Distribute

Hobson and Waldrop insist that the record is devoid of evidence that they entered into a conspiratorial agreement with the other co-defendants; at best, they contend, the evidence indicates that they were merely buyers from and not members of the conspiracy.

In order for a defendant to be found guilty of conspiracy, the government must demonstrate that a conspiracy existed, that the defendant had knowledge of it, and that he or she voluntarily became a part of it. *United States v. Badolato*, 701 F.2d 915, 920 (11th Cir.1983); *United States v. Lippner*, 676 F.2d 456, 466 (11th Cir.1982). The existence of a conspiracy may be demonstrated by circumstantial evidence such as inferences from the conduct of the defendant or circumstances indicating a scheme or plan. The knowledge requirement refers simply to knowledge of the essential objective of the conspiracy; a defendant may be found guilty notwithstanding that he did not have knowledge of all the details of the conspiracy or played only a minor role in the total operation. *Badolato*, 701 F.2d at 918-20; *United States v. Corbin*, 734 F.2d 643 (11th Cir.1984).

It is settled that the existence of a simple buyer-seller relationship alone does not furnish the requisite evidence of a conspiratorial agreement. *United States v. Braico*, 422 F.2d 543 (7th Cir.1970); *United States v. Watson*, 594 F.2d 1330, 1337 (10th Cir.1979); *United States v. Torres*, 503 F.2d 1120, 1123 (2d Cir.1974). It is equally will settled, however, that where a buyer knowingly assumes a role instrumental to the success of the conspiracy, the jury may properly infer that he is a member in it. *United States v. Apollo*, 476 F.2d 156, 162 (5th Cir.1973) (finding it unnecessary "to define precisely how limited purchases, in number or size, may be in such 'mere purchases' cases and still permit the intent to participate in an unlawful conspiracy to be inferred," because "in the present case, there was direct proof of a continuing relationship between Apollo and Cocroft, a known conspirator,

which resulted on at least two occasions in the witting transfer of company marijuana to Apollo"); *United States v. Hess*, 691 F.2d 984, 988 (11th Cir. 1982) (while a fence does not automatically become a conspirator by purchasing stolen property, fences are necessary to the success of a hijacking conspiracy, and a fence who holds himself out as a place to dispose of stolen goods is a conspirator).

In this case, it is clear that Hobson and Waldrop were more than "mere purchasers." They were among the selling group's best buyers, they purchased from the selling group on numerous occasions, and maintained a close relationship with the selling group. The success of the selling group's endeavors depended upon the participation and cooperation of Hobson and Waldrop: Waldrop's failure to pick up the marijuana from the Tallahassee warehouse as scheduled resulted in a delay that led to seizure of the shipment, and the success of the Constellation episode depended upon Hobson's and Waldrop's willingness to purchase a majority if not all of the marijuana load. Accordingly, we find the evidence more than sufficient to sustain the conclusion that Hobson and Waldrop had entered into a conspiratorial agreement with the other co-defendants.

Hobson and Waldrop further argue that regardless of whether their role as frequent buyers is sufficient to demonstrate their complicity in a conspiracy to possess marijuana, the evidence remained insufficient to support the inference that they had knowledge that the marijuana was imported. Accordingly, they contend that their convictions for conspiracy to import cannot stand, because they had no knowledge of an essential objective of the conspiracy.

In order to be guilty of conspiring to import a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963, the defendant must have known that the substance was imported. *United States v. Steward*, 451 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir.1971); *Mason v. United States*, 383 F.2d 107 (10th Cir.1967). A defendant will not be held to have knowledge of an illegal importation solely on the basis of evidence that one or more of his alleged co-conspirators

had such knowledge; nevertheless, direct or circumstantial evidence may justify an inference of knowledge. *Mason v. United States*, 383 F.2d 107 (10th Cir.1967).

Here, there is no question that marijuana was imported from Colombia, South America into the United States by means of boat and airplane. There is likewise no question that Hobson and Waldrop's co-defendants were aware that the marijuana was imported. In light of the massive quantity of marijuana involved, the frequency with which Waldrop and Hobson had occasion to deal with the other members of the enterprise, the fact that Hobson, Waldrop and Cobb were described as the principal organizers of the Constellation episode in which marijuana was to be delivered by airplane from Colombia to southern Florida, and the presence of both Hobson and Waldrop at various of the organization's stash houses on numerous occasions, the jury was warranted in finding that Hobson and Waldrop knew the marijuana was imported. *United States v. Corbin*, 734 F.2d 643 (11th Cir.1984); *United States v. Garcia*, 721 F.2d 721, 725 (11th Cir.1983).

B. The RICO Offenses

Subsection (c) of 18 U.S.C. § 1962 makes it unlawful to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of an enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. Subsection (d), in turn, makes it unlawful to conspire to violate the provisions of subsection (c).

Hobson was convicted of a substantive RICO violation pursuant to subsection (c), as well as a RICO conspiracy under subsection (d). The basis for Hobson's RICO convictions arose from his involvment in the Constellation episode in connection with which he was indicted and convicted of importation and possession with intent to distribute marijuana.[14] Hobson argues that these two convictions were

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[14] It may be recalled that Hobson was also convicted of conspiracy to possess and conspiracy to import, which would qualify as additional acts of racketeering under the Act; the indictment,

(footnote continued on next page)

the result of a single attempt on his part to procure marijuana, and that consequently he was not shown to have engaged or conspired to engage in a "pattern" of racketeering activity.

"Pattern of racketeering activity" is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) as "at least two acts of racketeering activity" committed within a ten-year period. "Racketeering activity" is defined to include "any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or *dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs*, which is chargeable under state law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (emphasis supplied). The statutory definition of pattern of racketeering activity has been construed as follows:

> To be convicted of a § 1962(c) RICO charge, the evidence must show that the defendant participated in the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. This requires the commission of at least *two predicate crimes.*

United States v. Welch, 656 F.2d 1039, 1057 (5th Cir. 1981) (emphasis supplied). Possessing and importing marijuana are two separate crimes and consequently two separate acts for purposes of the RICO statute. The appellants' suggestion that two predicate acts cannot have arisen out of a single transaction was expressly considered and rejected in *United States v. Phillips*, 664 F.2d 971, 1039 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981).

Waldrop's convictions under the RICO statute stem from his involvement in both the Tallahassee warehouse and Constellation episodes. The predicate acts of racketeering activity underlying the RICO counts included: possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, in connection with the

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(footnote continued from preceding page)

however, limited the predicate acts alleged against Hobson under the RICO charges to the two substantive offenses.

Tallahassee warehouse venture; and importation and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute in connection with the Constellation venture.[15]

It is Waldrop's position that the Constellation venture was independently undertaken by Cobb, Hobson and Waldrop and was not an affair of the enterprise. If the predicate acts alleged in connection with Constellation venture are stripped from indictment on the ground that they were unrelated to the enterprise's affairs, only one predicate act remains—the possession of marijuana stored at the Tallahassee warehouse —which alone does not constitute a "pattern" of racketeering activity. In support of his position, Waldrop makes two related arguments. First, Waldrop assigns error to the district court's refusal to read Waldrop's requested instructions concerning the definition of the enterprise, and Waldrop's theory of defense. Second, Waldrop argues that the evidence does not support the conclusion that the Constellation venture was an affair of the enterprise.

At trial, Waldrop requested that the following instruction be read respecting the definition of the RICO enterprise in this case:

> In order to find defendant, Patrick M. Waldrop, guilty of Count 2, you must find that the government has proven, beyond a reasonable doubt that, the enterprise established by Manuel Eric Villanueva, Jose Luis Acosta and Antonio E. Bascaro, as previously described, existed in fact, and that Mr. Waldrop knowingly and willfully participated in the conduct of this particular enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. In order to conclude that Mr. Waldrop participated through a pattern of racketeering activity, you

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[15] Like Hobson, Waldrop was also convicted on conspiracy charges, but again the indictment did not list those charges as predicate acts in the RICO count.

must find that he committed at least two of the following acts and that they were in furtherance of the conduct of this particular conspiracy: (the three previously mentioned affirmative acts are then recited).

The district court rejected Waldrop's proposed instruction in favor of the following:

> Count 2 of the indictment alleges that from on or about January 1977 and continuously afterwards up to and including September 3, 1981, defendants Manuel Eric Villanueva, Antonio E. Bascaro, Manuel W. James, Gustavo J. Fernandez, Patrick C. Waldrop, and Russell Hobson were persons associated with an enterprise or an enterprise as defined by Title 18, United States Code, § 1961(4), that the enterprise engaged in or its activities affected interstate commerce and that the defendants knowingly and willfully participated in the enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering endeavor in violation of Title 18, United States Code, § 1962(c). . . . Count 2 alleges that the enterprise consisted of a group of individuals associated in fact for the purpose of importing multi-ton quantities of marijuana into the United States from a place outside of the United States, possessing multi-ton quantities of marijuana with the intent to distribute and distributing within the United States, multi-ton quantities of marijuana, a Schedule I controlled substance. Now let me define some of the terms of this statute for you. The term enterprise, as used in the statute, includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity and any group of individuals associated in fact, although not a legal entity. . . . In order to establish that any of the defendants named in Count 2 of the indictment committed the offense charged in that count, the government must prove as to that particular defendant each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt. First, that the defendant was associated with an enterprise as I have defined it for you. Second, that the

> defendant engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity as I have defined it for you by knowingly and willfully committing, or knowingly and willfully aiding and abetting at least two acts of racketeering activity as hereinafter explained. That at least two acts of racketeering activity occurred within ten years of each other, that one of such offenses took place after October the 10th, 1970, *that the offenses were connected with each other by some common scheme, plan or motive so as to constitute a pattern, and not merely a series of disconnected acts.* Fourth, that the commission of two or more connected offenses the defendants conducted or participated in the conduct of the enterprise. Fifth, that the enterprise engaged in or that its activities affected interstate or foreign commerce.

Waldrop argues that in defining the enterprise as a group associated in fact for the purpose of importing and possessing marijuana, the instruction delivered would lead the jury to find that any marijuana smuggling venture undertaken by one or more of the defendants would necessarily be a venture of the enterprise. Put another way, Waldrop contends that the enterprise was defined for the jury solely in terms of the racketeering activity it allegedly conducted, so that any conduct qualifying as an act of racketeering under the Act would be ascribed to the enterprise, regardless of whether independently undertaken, as Waldrop contends was the case with the Constellation venture. In Waldrop's view, the instruction he proposed avoided this pitfall by more precisely defining the charged enterprise in terms of its principal organizers.

Waldrop is quite correct that the existence of an enterprise is an element of a RICO violation distinct from the element of a pattern of racketeering activity in which the enterprise engages. *United States v. Phillips*, 664 F.2d 971, 1011 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981); *United States v. Lemm*, 680 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir.1982); *United States v. Anderson*, 626 F.2d 1358 (8th

Cir.1980). We do not agree, however, that the instruction delivered would have the effect Waldrop suggests.

The district court described the enterprise in question in terms of a group of individuals defined to include Bascaro, Villanueva, James, Fernandez, Waldrop, and Hobson who were associated in fact for the purpose of importing, possessing and distributing marijuana. We do not believe that this instruction could be misunderstood to permit the jury to ascribe to the enterprise smuggling ventures independently undertaken by one or more of its members. The instruction permitted the jury to find that Hobson and Waldrop's activities with respect to the Constellation smuggling venture could be included among the overt acts of racketeering activity needed to establish a "pattern" under the RICO statute, only if such activity was associated with the affairs of the enterprise, defined in terms of all named defendants and their common purpose. The court's refusal to read Waldrop's proposed instruction, therefore, was not fatal.

Waldrop further argues that even if the court's instruction was proper, it was error not to recite Waldrop's theory of defense. Waldrop's proposed instruction states as follows:

> Mr. Waldrop's theory of the defense is that he must be acquitted of the charges contained in Count 2 of this indictment, because the government has not proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, the following: (1) that he knowingly or willfully participated, directly or indirectly, in any enterprise established by Manuel Eric Villanueva, Jose Luis Acosta, and Antonio E. Bascaro through a pattern of racketeering activity; (2) that the evidence fails to establish that he committed two acts of racketeering which were connected, directly or indirectly, to the enterprise established by Manual Eric Villanueva, Jose Luis Acosta, and Antonio E. Bascaro.

A district court's refusal to deliver a defendant's requested instruction will constitute reversible error "if and only if the requested instruction (1) is correct, (2) is not substantially

covered by other instructions which were delivered, and (3) deals with some point in the trial so 'vital' that the failure to give the requested instruction seriously impaired the defendant's ability to defend." *United States v. Stone*, 702 F.2d 1333, 1339 (11th Cir.1983). We are satisfied that the requested instruction was substantially covered by other instructions delivered. The only difference between the "theory of defense" instruction requested and the instruction given was that the instruction given defined the enterprise in terms of its participants and purpose instead of its organizers, which for reasons given above is not a difference so vital as to impair the defendants' ability to defend under the instruction delivered.

We are further satisfied that the evidence supported the jury's finding that the Constellation episode was an affair of the enterprise and not a free-lance smuggling venture. The venture was headed by Cobb, a self-described leader of the enterprise. James was called upon to serve as counsel to the participants, just as he had been with virtually all of the affairs of the enterprise. Finally, Acosta assumed responsibility for the venture by stepping in to rescue Cobb after the venture had failed. Viewing the record in a light most favorable to the government, we hold that the above-mentioned facts could combine to lead a reasonable juror to conclude that the Constellation venture was an affair of the charged enterprise.

C. Importation and Possession of Marijuana with Intent to Distribute

The gist of Hobson and Waldrop's contention with respect to the possession and importation counts is that they never had constructive or actual possession of the marijuana, nor were they physically responsible for the importation. Hobson candidly acknowledges that to the extent he is linked to a conspiracy to possess or import, he may be found guilty of the completed acts of possession and importation notwithstanding that he did not physically commit them. *Pinkerton v. United States*, 328 U.S. 640, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 90 L.Ed. 1489

(1946). He points out, however, that before a defendant may be convicted of substantive offenses on the basis of acts committed by his co-conspirators, a jury instruction outlining that basis for liability must be given. *United States v. Monaco*, 702 F.2d 860, 881 (11th Cir.1983). Inexplicably, the government did not request and the district court did not deliver a *Pinkerton*-type instruction. The court did, however, instruct the jury that a defendant would properly be found guilty of a substantive offense were he to aid or abet another in its commission.

Hobson and Waldrop's convictions for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute must be upheld if the evidence is sufficient to sustain the finding that they had either constructive or actual possession, or that they aided and abetted another who had constructive or actual possession. We have little trouble holding that Waldrop had constructive possession over the marijuana seized at the Tallahassee warehouse. "Constructive possession consists of the knowing exercise or the knowing power or right to exercise dominion and control over the substance." *United States v. Knight*, 705 F.2d 432, 433 (11th Cir.1983). Testimony adduced at trial indicated that 40,000 pounds of the Tallahassee warehouse load was set aside for Waldrop; that Waldrop personally stacked a number of bales and set them aside with the intent to pick them up later; and finally, that he was stopped by law enforcement agents upon his return to the warehouse. Taken together, these facts amply demonstrate that Waldrop exercised dominion and control over the marijuana in question.

With respect to the Constellation venture, the evidence would not appear to support a finding that Hobson or Waldrop exercised either actual or constructive possession over the marijuana on board the aircraft. The mere fact that they had made a deposit of $1,500,000 on the incoming shipment does not satisfy the requirement that they exercised dominion and control over it. The absence of actual or constructive possession, however, does not foreclose the possibility that

they were properly convicted under an aider and abettor theory of liability. Hobson is mistaken in his belief that he may not be convicted as an aider and abettor when he was indicted as a principal only: "One who has been indicted as a principal may be convicted on evidence showing only that he aided and abetted the commission of the offense." *United States v. Oquendo*, 505 F.2d 1307, 1310 n. 1 (5th Cir.1975).

In *United States v. Trevino*, 556 F.2d 1265 (5th Cir.1977), the court set out the requirements for aiding and abetting possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute:

> Trevino and Gonzalez were charged in this count under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976), making illegal any possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1970), providing that "whoever . . . aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures" the commission of a federal crime is punishable as a principal for the violation itself. To aid or abet another in the commission of a crime within the meaning of the statute requires that the defendant "in some sort associate himself with the venture, that he participate in it as something that he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to make it succeed."

Id. at 1269 (citations omitted). In this case, Cobb indicated that he, Waldrop and Hobson were primarily responsible for the Constellation venture. Waldrop and Hobson advanced money to Cobb to purchase the marijuana in Colombia. After the initial airplane venture had failed, both Hobson and Waldrop made telephone calls to Cobb pressuring him to attempt a second airplane venture. Cobb agreed, after securing a promise that Hobson and Waldrop would purchase a substantial portion if not all of the load. These facts establish to our satisfaction that Hobson and Waldrop could properly be found to have associated themselves with the venture and to have sought by their actions to make the venture succeed. *Trevino*, 556 F.2d at 1269-70.

The appellants' reliance upon *United States v. Jackson* for a contrary conclusion is misplaced. 526 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1976). There, the evidence indicated that Jackson assisted his co-defendant in the distribution of cocaine already in the possession of the co-defendant. Jackson's conviction for aiding and abetting his co-defendant in the possession with intent to distribute cocaine was reversed on appeal, on the ground that while evidence was sufficient to support his conviction for aiding and abetting the distribution of cocaine, there was no evidence that he aided and abetted the possession. The court's conclusion was based upon an absence of evidence that Jackson had helped his co-defendant obtain the cocaine; rather, it was clear that Jackson did not aid or abet his colleague until after the cocaine had come into the co-defendant's possession. In contrast, Hobson and Waldrop's efforts were directed toward assisting Cobb in acquiring the marijuana. The court's opinion in *Jackson* is thus wholly consistent with our conclusion that Hobson and Waldrop were properly convicted of possession under an aiding and abetting theory.

III. Bascaro

The only issue raised by Bascaro that merits discussion and that was not considered previously as a common issue, is his double jeopardy claim.[16] The government appears to acknowledge that Bascaro was previously tried and convicted of conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute in connection with a smuggling venture undertaken by the enterprise/conspiracy being prosecuted in the instant case. If true, this state of affairs would raise a question as to the validity of Bascaro's subsequent continuing criminal enterprise conviction and possibly his RICO

[16] As previously discussed in connection with Villanueva's continuing criminal enterprise conviction (CCE), conspiracy to import is a lesser included offense of CCE; in light of Bascaro's CCE conviction, we must therefore vacate his other conspiracy conviction on double jeopardy grounds.

conspiracy conviction in this case. *See United States v. Phillips*, 664 F.2d 971, 1015 n. 64 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981); *see generally id.* at 1004-1015. We do not, however, reach the merits of Bascaro's double jeopardy claim. The issue is raised for the first time on appeal; Bascaro's double jeopardy defense was thus waived by his failure to assert it at trial. *Grogan v. United States*, 394 F.2d 287, 289 (5th Cir.1967).

Bascaro attempts to justify his failure to raise the double jeopardy defense until now on the basis of the district court's denial of Bascaro's motion for a bill of particulars. This is an exercise in obfuscation. In order to make a timely objection to the instant prosecution on the double jeopardy grounds previously discussed, Bascaro needed only the indictment and record of judgment in the former prosecution, and the indictment in the present case. A bill of particulars would have furnished no additional relevant information.

Bascaro's motion for a bill of particulars, and his assignment of error to the court's refusal to grant that motion, relates to a different and less troubling double jeopardy claim. The function of a bill of particulars is to provide a defendant with information about the details of the charge against him if this is necessary to the preparation of his defense, and to avoid prejudicial surprise at the trial. *United States v. Diecidue*, 603 F.2d 535 (5th Cir.1979); *see also* C. Wright, *Federal Practice and Procedure* § 129. A bill of particulars has been held to be appropriate where necessary to permit the defendant to plead double jeopardy in the event of a subsequent prosecution of the same offense. *United States v. Gorel*, 622 F.2d 100, 104 (5th Cir.1979). The thrust of Bascaro's argument is that his activities in connection with the smuggling episode for which he had been previously convicted were not listed among the overt acts of the enterprise in the instant indictment, yet were used to convict him again here. He asserts that a bill of particulars would have revealed as much, but that as a consequence of the denial of his motion for a bill of particulars, Bascaro was unprepared to lodge a double jeopardy objection.

The motion for a bill of particulars was properly denied. Acts committed by Bascaro in connection with the episode for which he was previously tried were not included among the overt acts listed in the present indictment for the very simple reason that those acts were not part of the present indictment. The fact that various witnesses made passing references to the episode in the course of their testimony does not prove the contrary. In short, Bascaro was not convicted in this case on the basis of facts peculiar to the incident for which he had been previously tried, and a bill of particulars amplifying the details of the charges against him in this case would have served no purpose.

Conclusion

James raises no issues singular to him that warrant separate discussion. He and other defendants raise a number of questions concerning a variety of alleged prosecutorial misconduct that a review of the record reveals are wholly without merit. The convictions of Hobson, Waldrop, Fernandez, and James are affirmed. Villanueva's convictions for conspiracy to import a controlled substance and conspiracy to possess a controlled substance with intent to distribute are vacated, as is Bascaro's conviction for conspiracy to import. Their remaining convictions are affirmed.

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART.

APPENDIX 2

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 82-5547

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ANTONIO E. BASCARO,
PATRICK M. WALDROP,
RUSSELL HOBSON, III,
MANUEL ERIC VILLANUEVA,
GUSTAVO J. FERNANDEZ,
MANUEL W. JAMES,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida

ON PETITIONS FOR REHEARING AND
SUGGESTIONS FOR REHEARING EN BANC

(Opinion October 1, 1984, 11 Cir., 1984, ...F.2d....)
(December 6, 1984)

Before HENDERSON and CLARK, Circuit Judges, and ATKINS,* District Judge.
PER CURIAM:

(✓) The Petitions for Rehearing are DENIED and no member of this panel nor other Judge in regular active service on the Court having requested that the Court be polled on rehearing en banc (Rule 35, Federal Rules of

*Honorable C. Clyde Atkins, U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of Florida, sitting by designation.

Appellate Procedure; Eleventh Circuit Rule 26), the Suggestions for Rehearing En Banc are DENIED.

( ) The Petitions for Rehearing are DENIED and the Court having been polled at the request of one of the members of the Court and a majority of the Circuit Judges who are in regular active service not having voted in favor of it (Rule 35, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure; Eleventh Circuit Rule 26), the Suggestions for Rehearing En Banc are also DENIED.

( ) A member of the Court in active service having requested a poll on the reconsideration of this cause en banc, and a majority of the judges in active service not having voted in favor of it, rehearing en banc is DENIED.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT:

/s/ *Thomas A. Clark*
United States Circuit Judge

APPENDIX 3

STATUTES INVOLVED

RICO definitions: 18 U.S.C. § § 1961 (1)(A), (D), (4), (5) [pertinent portions]

§ 1961. Definitions

As used in this chapter—

(1) "racketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving . . . dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year;

* * *

(D) any offense involving . . . the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of the United States;

* * *

(4) "enterprise" includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity;

(5) "pattern of racketeering activity" requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity;

RICO prohibited activities: 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), (d) [pertinent portions]

§ 1962. Prohibited activities

* * *

(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of

which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. . . .

(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section.

Office - Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
MAY 21 1985
ALEXANDER L. STEVAS,
CLERK

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Nos. 84-1148, 84-1164, and 84-1403

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1984

RUSSELL HOBSON, III, PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PATRICK C. WALDROP, PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MANUEL ERIC VILLANUEVA, PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITIONS FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether marijuana offenses may serve as predicate offenses for prosecutions under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1962.

2. Whether two or more offenses arising out of the same criminal episode satisfy the predicate act requirement of the RICO statute.

3. Whether the jury instructions were sufficient to ensure that petitioner Waldrop would not be convicted on the RICO charges in the indictment unless the jury found the existence of an enterprise and the commission of multiple enterprise-related offenses.

4. Whether the court of appeals correctly sustained the validity of two amendments to a wiretap authorization issued by a state judge.

5. Whether petitioner Hobson was deprived of due process because the court of appeals' review of his sufficiency claim allegedly was based upon inaccurate factual statements in the government's brief.

6. Whether a pre-trial order disqualifying petitioner Hobson's original counsel because the anticipated trial testimony of two government witnesses was likely to implicate the lawyer in some of the charges in the indictment became erroneous when the implicating evidence was not adduced at trial.

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In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1984

No. 84-1148

RUSSELL HOBSON, III, PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 84-1164

PATRICK C. WALDROP, PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 84-1403

MANUEL ERIC VILLANUEVA, PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITIONS FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the courts of appeals (Pet. App. 1-50)[1] is reported at 742 F.2d 1335.

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[1]"Pet. App." refers to the appendix to the petition in No. 84-1148 unless otherwise indicated.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on October 1, 1984. Petitions for rehearing filed by each petitioner were denied on December 6, 1984 (84-1148 Pet. App. 51-52; 84-1164 Pet. App. C1-C2; 84-1403 Pet. App. 51-52). The petition for a writ of certiorari in No. 84-1148 was filed on January 16, 1985, the petition in No. 84-1164 was filed on January 17, 1985, and the petition in No. 84-1403 was filed on March 5, 1985.[2] The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATEMENT

Following a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, petitioners were convicted of conspiracy to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) (Count 1); the completed RICO substantive offense (Count 2); conspiracy to import marijuana (Count 3); importation of marijuana (Count 4 (Hobson and Waldrop only)); conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute (Count 5); possession of marijuana with intent to distribute (Count 8 as to Villanueva, Count 9 as to Waldrop, and Count 10 as to Waldrop and Hobson); and engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise (Count 25 as to Villanueva), in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962 and 21 U.S.C. 963, 952, 846, 841 and 848. Petitioner Hobson was sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment for each count on which he was convicted totalling 35 years; he also was fined a total of $110,000 on Counts 1 through 5 and Count 10. Petitioner Waldrop was sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment for each count on which he was convicted totalling 40 years; he also was fined various sums on each count, totalling $125;000.

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[2]On January 19, 1985, Justice Powell extended the time for the filing of petitioner Villanueva's petition for a writ of certiorari (No. 84-1403) to and including March 6, 1985.

Petitioner Villanueva's consecutive sentences totalled 60 years' imprisonment, and his cumulative fines amounted to $220,000. In addition, each petitioner was given a two-year special parole term. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions of Hobson and Waldrop in all respects. In light of the affirmance of his continuing criminal enterprise conviction, Villanueva's convictions for conspiracy to import marijuana and conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute (Counts 3 and 5) were vacated on double jeopardy grounds (see *Jeffers* v. *United States*, 432 U.S. 137 (1977)). Villanueva's convictions on all other counts were affirmed.

The evidence showed that in late 1977 Villanueva and co-defendants Jose Acosta and Antonio Bascaro were operating a large marijuana importation organization in southern Florida (38 R. 148-150).[3] In the latter part of that year, Clyde ("Bill") Cobb became a member of the organization, assuming responsibility for storing the marijuana after importation and distributing the marijuana to wholesalers (38 R. 150). Before that year's end, Cobb recruited his brother-in-law, Dan Abbey, to keep track of the organization's accounts (40 R. 10). Abbey estimated that during the time of his participation in the enterprise approximately 750,000 to 1.5 million pounds of marijuana had been imported and distributed, generating proceeds in excess of $175,000,000 (40 R. 66-67).

In December 1977, the enterprise moved its operations to northern Florida (38 R. 150-151; 40 R. 10-11). A farm suitable for storing marijuana was located near Cottondale, Florida (38 R. 150). Cobb made a cash down payment of $180,000 to buy the farm, using funds belonging to Acosta and Bascaro and delivered to him by petitioner Villanueva (38 R. 152-153). Shortly thereafter, more than 40,000

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[3] "R." refers to the 50-volume record on appeal.

pounds of marijuana that had been carried aboard a converted shrimper, the *Tanila,* was transferred to the farm (40 R. 10-12). Villanueva was among those supervising the offloading (40 R. 11). Within two or three days, several buyers, including Waldrop and Hobson, arrived at the farm to purchase quantities of the cargo (38 R. 154). On this occasion, Waldrop bought 10,000 pounds (40 R. 14). After the entire load had been distributed, Abbey collected the moneys due from the buyers; in turn, he made periodic trips to Acosta's house in the Miami area, where he turned the payments over to Villanueva (40 R. 15-16). The total amount delivered for the *Tanila* load was between $8 and $9 million (40 R. 15).

In January 1978 another vessel, the *Navigator,* arrived at a clandestine offloading site near Fort Walton Beach (40 R. 18-19), and 40,000-45,000 pounds of marijuana were offloaded in the presence of Villanueva and other supervisors (38 R. 150; 40 R. 19-20). The cargo was transported to the Cottondale farm, weighed and stored there (34 R. 134-135; 40 R. 20), and subsequently distributed to customers, including Waldrop and Hobson (34 R. 135-136; 38 R. 157-158). Following distribution, Abbey once again made the rounds of the buyers to secure payment. He then proceeded periodically to Acosta's home to hand over the receipts to either Acosta or Villanueva. The total amount collected was about the same as for the *Tanila* load—$8 or $9 million. 40 R. 20-21.

After a third load of marijuana had been stored at the Cottondale farm and distributed to customers from that site, the leaders of the trafficking enterprise became concerned that the neighbors were suspicious of activities at the farm. Accordingly, they purchased a fishing camp on the Aucilla River in the Florida panhandle and a farm in Madison County to serve as new offloading and storage sites. 38 R. 160-163. In mid-March a load of marijuana arrived at

the fishing camp by vessel, and the cargo was successfully transferred to the Madison County farm, from which it was distributed without incident (38 R. 162). As before, Abbey collected millions of dollars from the buyers of this shipment and turned the proceeds over to Villanueva (40 R. 49).

In late March or early April another vessel, the *Miss Too Nicey,* reached the fishing camp (36 R. 139-140; 38 R. 163). In the presence of Acosta, Bascaro, and Villanueva, the vessel's 73,000-pound cargo of marijuana was offloaded and trucked to the Madison County farm (36 R. 140-141, 144; 38 R. 163). There, the weighing and storage was conducted in the presence of Villanueva, Bascaro, and Thomas Alexander (36 R. 141). Shortly thereafter, Hobson and an associate came to the farm in an 18-wheel truck to take 25,000 pounds of marijuana. Hobson revealed to Alexander that he and Waldrop were partners. 36 R. 141-143; 40 R. 55.

The use of the Madison County farm as a storage facility lasted only about one month. During that period, state law enforcement officers became suspicious of the activities occurring at the farm and commenced surveillance (31 R. 68-70). When Alexander and others detected the surveillance, the leaders of the enterprise decided to find a new storage facility (36 R. 145).

In April 1978 the enterprise rented a warehouse in Tallahassee, and the 6,000 pounds of marijuana remaining at the Madison County farm were transferred to the warehouse (36 R. 146-147). That warehouse proved to be too small to store an expected double load—80,000 pounds of marijuana. Consequently, the enterprise leased a second warehouse in Tallahassee. GX 10; 31 R. 148-150. On two consecutive evenings in late April, boatloads of marijuana were offloaded at the fishing camp and trucked to the larger warehouse in Tallahassee (36 R. 147; 38 R. 168-169). Waldrop visited the warehouse and set aside 40,000 pounds for

pickup later that week (40 R. 53). Before Waldrop could make his pickup, however, state law enforcement officers entered the warehouse, seized 70,293 pounds of marijuana, and arrested six individuals (31 R. 74-79, 93, 151; 36 R. 148; 40 R. 52-53). The officers also seized detailed records of amounts received, amounts distributed, and money owed by a number of individuals. Listed among the debtors were "Pat" (Waldrop) and "Russ" (Hobson) (31 R. 85-89).

While the officers were inspecting the warehouse, Waldrop arrived there in a rented car. He was stopped and questioned by a police officer, and he consented to a search of a briefcase in his car. Inside the briefcase the officer found a notebook and loose sheets, all of which contained records of marijuana transactions. 31 R. 79-81. Some of the items (GX 7) were duplicates of records kept by Abbey for Acosta and Villanueva (GX 145; 40 R. 44-46). Although the records were seized, Waldrop was released (31 R. 89-90). He telephoned Cobb and reported the loss of the records (38 R. 170).

Because of the loss of the large Tallahassee warehouse, the need for a new storage site again arose. That need became urgent when Cobb learned that 150,000 pounds of marijuana already were en route to Florida (38 R. 175). A member of the enterprise located a tobacco barn deemed suitable for use as a storage facility near the town of Quincy in Gadsden County, Florida (*ibid.*).

Three vessels were involved in the 150,000 pound delivery. The first was successfully offloaded, after which the marijuana was transferred to the Quincy barn (38 R. 175). The other two vessels were sent out to sea for a few more days because the offloaders could not handle them immediately (38 R. 175-176). While at sea, those vessels were boarded by Coast Guard officers, and their cargo of marijuana was seized (31 R. 238-240; 34 R. 4-6; 38 R. 175-176). On July 21, 1978, local officers, armed with a warrant,

searched the Quincy barn and seized numerous bales of marijuana and drug paraphernalia (31 R. 253-255).

Thereafter, a meeting was held at Cobb's home in southern Florida to discuss moving the enterprise to Georgia (38 R. 177-178). Among the participants in the discussions were Cobb, Acosta, Bascaro, and Villanueva (38 R. 178-179). Arrangements were made to use Morgan's Boat Dock in Savannah (33 R. 22-25; 34 R. 154). On November 24, 1978, the *Sea Star* arrived there with a cargo of marijuana weighing 40,224 pounds (32 R. 32-37). Federal law enforcement officers intercepted the vessel and seized its cargo (32 R. 31-35).

Shortly thereafter, Cobb decided to engage in a new venture (39 R. 44-47). Instead of using boats, Cobb decided to attempt to smuggle marijuana by airplane (38 R. 186). In mid-January 1979, pursuant to Cobb's plan, James McDonnell flew a DC-3 airplane to Colombia, took on a cargo of marijuana, and flew back to Fort Lauderdale. The plane and its cargo were seized by federal and local law enforcement agents at the Fort Lauderdale airport. 32 R. 127, 151-154.

Two weeks later, McDonnell agreed to make a second attempt to smuggle marijuana by aircraft (32 R. 156-157). Waldrop had made a down payment of $1,500,000 to Abbey, and he and Hobson consequently expected to receive a substantial part of the planeload of marijuana (38 R. 187; 40 R. 55). Waldrop and Hobson pressured Cobb to produce the marijuana or return the $1,500,000 (38 R. 220-223). On February 13, 1979, McDonnell and two others flew to Colombia in a Lockheed Constellation and obtained 25,795 pounds of marijuana (32 R. 140, 160-161). Trucks furnished by Waldrop and Hobson were readied to meet the airplane at a clandestine site to take possession of most of the Constellation's cargo (39 R. 10-12). On the return flight,

however, fog and engine problems prevented the Constellation from landing at the clandestine site (32 R. 163-166). McDonnell finally landed at an airport in Panama City in the early morning hours of February 14 (32 R. 166). Federal agents arrested the crew members and seized the marijuana (32 R. 132-140, 167; 38 R. 187-188). Several hours after the Constellation was supposed to have arrived at the pre-arranged site, Hobson telephoned Cobb to ask what had happened (39 R. 18).

At the same time that Cobb was planning the airplane smuggling ventures, he met with Acosta, Bascaro, and Villanueva to discuss a second attempt to bring a boatload of marijuana into Savannah (38 R. 186, 188). In March 1979 a vessel with 40,000 pounds of marijuana reached Savannah, but it was detected there by law enforcement officers (38 R. 188-191). After that loss, the principals decided once again to use the Aucilla River fishing camp as their offloading site (38 R. 191). In April 1979, two boatloads of marijuana were successfully offloaded there (38 R. 193). After distribution to buyers, Abbey made his rounds and then transferred between $15 and $18 million to Villanueva or another individual acting in his stead (40 R. 56-57).

No further activity occurred until early 1981. Then, the *Miss Sunbury* was sent from Key West to obtain a load of marijuana (38 R. 194-195). Carrying 23,460 pounds of marijuana, the *Miss Sunbury* reached the Aucilla River fishing camp without detection (32 R. 210-211; 38 R. 195); however, it was sent back to sea without having been emptied of its cargo because Villanueva, after performing a quasi-religious ritual, had determined that the time for offloading was not satisfactory (38 R. 195). On February 26, 1981, Customs officers boarded the *Miss Sunbury* and seized its cargo of marijuana (32 R. 207, 211).

ARGUMENT

1. The sole argument common to all three petitions (and the only issue raised by petitioner Villanueva) is he contention that petitioners' large scale marijuana trafficking scheme does not constitute "racketeering activity" within the meaning of RICO, 18 U.S.C. 1961(1)(D). The court of appeals' conclusion to the contrary is correct and does not conflict with any decision of this Court or of any other court of appeals. Further review of the issue is therefore unwarranted.

The RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. 1962(c), makes it unlawful for any person associated with an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce to participate in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. "Racketeering activity" is defined under 18 U.S.C. 1961(1)(D) to include certain state felonies and enumerated violations of federal criminal laws, including "the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotics or other dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of the United States." Petitioners contend that the absence of any explicit mention of marijuana in this definition signifies an intent on the part of Congress to exclude marijuana violations from the class of offenses that may form the basis for a conviction under RICO. Petitioners therefore claim that their RICO convictions, which were premised solely upon involvement in marijuana trafficking, must be reversed.

As petitioner Waldrop notes (84-1164 Pet. 28), the same issue was raised in *Gustafson* v. *United States*, cert. denied, No. 84-482 (Jan. 21, 1985). We are furnishing petitioners' counsel with copies of our brief in opposition in *Gustafson;* that brief fully responds to most of petitioners' contentions. As we noted in that brief (at 5), it appears that Congress deliberately deleted a specific reference to "marijuana" that had appeared in early drafts of the RICO legislation

because marijuana was encompassed within the phrase "other dangerous drugs" that was added to the bill that Congress enacted into law. Consequently, the earlier references to marijuana became surplusage. Moreover, the express legislative mandate that the RICO statute "shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes" contradicts the narrow interpretation advanced by petitioners. Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947, 18 U.S.C. 1961 note; see 84-482 Br. in Opp. at 6-7. Certainly, the purposes of the RICO statute are furthered by applying it to offenses relating to the sort of massive marijuana trafficking enterprise involved in this case.

Petitioner Hobson makes one additional argument on the marijuana issue. He contends (84-1148 Pet. 11) that the enactment in 1980 of an amendment to 21 U.S.C. 841 increasing the penalties for large-scale marijuana trafficking was deemed necessary by Congress because at that time —ten years after the passage of RICO—Congress was concerned that the penalties for trafficking in marijuana were inadequate. Hobson argues that if Congress had believed that dealing in marijuana was encompassed within the RICO statute, which carries a maximum prison term of 20 years and a fine of up to $25,000 upon conviction (18 U.S.C. 1963(a)), it would not have been concerned about the fact that the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. 801 *et seq.*, limited the prison term for a convicted marijuana violator to five years, no matter how much marijuana was involved in the case. In Hobson's view, therefore, the 1980 amendment to 21 U.S.C. 841 was the result of Congress's belief that the 20-year RICO penalty did not apply to marijuana cases.

However, as Hobson readily admits (84-1148 Pet. 11), Congress made no mention of RICO coverage when it increased the penalties for trafficking in marijuana. The legislative history shows that the increased penalties were

passed as an amendment to the Infant Formula Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-359, 94 Stat. 1190 *et seq.*, and that the sole purpose of the amendment was to correct what Congress believed to have been an oversight in the enactment of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. 801 *et seq.* As Representative Carter stated, "Mr. Speaker, in 1970, I was a member of the Commerce Committee when it passed the Controlled Substances Act. Unfortunately, we did not make the penalties for marihuana as strict as they should have been." 126 Cong. Rec. 11791 (1980).

Moreover, when the amendment was enacted in 1980, the courts of appeals were in conflict as to whether RICO applied to purely illegal enterprises such as the one in which petitioners were involved. Until this Court resolved the question in *United States* v. *Turkette*, 452 U.S. 576 (1981), the practical use of the RICO statute to prosecute marijuana traffickers was uncertain for reasons quite apart from the issue presented here. Finally, the 1980 amendment to Section 841 substantially increased the fine for large-scale marijuana offenses (from $15,000 to $125,000) to a level far in excess of the fine that could be imposed under RICO, and also provided for the cumulation of prison sentences in excess of RICO's maximum in the case of a series of marijuana violations. In these circumstances, Congress's decision in 1980 to increase the penalties for trafficking in more than 1,000 pounds of marijuana cannot be taken as any reflection upon the legislative intent ten years prior thereto regarding the propriety of including marijuana as a "dangerous drug" encompassed by RICO.

2. The RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. 1961(5), requires the government to prove that the defendant committed at least two "predicate acts" of racketeering activity. Petitioner Hobson alleges (84-1148 Pet. 12-15) that because both of the predicate offenses of which he was convicted arose out

of the same criminal transaction, *i.e.*, the Constellation episode, he did not engage in a "pattern" of racketeering activity as required by RICO. Hobson's attempt to limit RICO coverage to separate transactions finds no judicial support; indeed, every court that has considered Hobson's argument has rejected it. *E.g., United States* v. *Pepe*, 747 F.2d 632, 661-663 (11th Cir. 1984); *United States* v. *Phillips*, 664 F.2d 971, 1039 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1136 (1982); *United States* v. *Weatherspoon*, 581 F.2d 595, 601-602 (7th Cir. 1978); *United States* v. *Parness*, 503 F.2d 430, 441-442 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975); *United States* v. *Salvitti*, 451 F. Supp. 195, 199-200 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 588 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1978) (Table).

These decisions are supported by the plain language of the statute. RICO defines racketeering activity in terms of felonious offenses, not transactions. 18 U.S.C. 1961(1)(D). Hobson does not contend that he did not commit two separate felonies, and nothing in the statutory language requires that the two offenses constituting the RICO predicates be premised upon two separate and distinct criminal transactions. Moreover, nothing contained in Hobson's excerpt (84-1148 Pet. 13) of S. Rep. 91-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969), discussing the meaning of "pattern of racketeering activity," conflicts with the unanimous view of the courts that two criminal offenses may comprise the requisite pattern even though they are part of the same ongoing criminal episode. Accordingly, further review of this issue is not warranted.[4]

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[4]Hobson also argues (84-1148 Pet. 14) that the Department of Justice guidelines in effect at the time he was indicted proscribed the bringing of a RICO indictment based upon a pattern of racketeering activity growing out of a single criminal episode or transaction. As Hobson acknowledges, however, the guidelines do not confer any rights upon defendants. The preface to the Department's RICO guidelines always has provided that they are for internal guidance only and that they "are not intended to, do not, and may not be relied upon to create any rights,

3. a. Petitioner Waldrop contends that his RICO convictions were improperly premised on a single predicate act. In fact, three predicate acts supported Waldrop's conviction on the RICO counts—two offenses related to the Constellation episode and one related to the Tallahassee warehouse. Nevertheless, Waldrop argues (84-1164 Pet. 11-17) that his RICO convictions cannot stand because the Constellation episode was a separate endeavor of Cobb's that was wholly unrelated to the activities of the RICO enterprise. Waldrop contends that the district court failed to give the jury proper instructions on the concept of a RICO enterprise, thereby erroneously allowing the jury to consider the Constellation episode as enterprise-related.

The court of appeals correctly rejected Waldrop's attack on the jury instructions (Pet. App. 43-44). Contrary to Waldrop's contention (84-1164 Pet. 16 (emphasis added)), the instructions given by the district court did not permit the jury to conclude that "*any* criminal activity related to the importation of marijuana by any of the persons charged in the indictment" was sufficient "to link that defendant inescapably to a racketeering enterprise." On the contrary, the district court instructed the jury that the government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that "*the [predicate] offenses were connected with each other by some common scheme, plan or motive so as to constitute a pattern, and not merely a series of disconnected acts.*" Pet. App. 43 (emphasis in original).

In addition, as the court of appeals determined (Pet. App. 45), there was ample evidence to connect the Constellation episode with the marijuana trafficking RICO enterprise

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substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any matter civil or ciminal." U.S. Dep't of Justice, *United States Attorneys' Manual* § 9-110.200 (Mar. 1984). Furthermore, the guidelines do not place any limitations on otherwise lawful litigative prerogatives of the Department of Justice. *Ibid.*

even though some key members of the enterprise did not actively participate in that venture. Among those enterprise participants who did were Cobb, Hobson, Waldrop, co-defendants Manuel James, Clifford Wentworth, and John M. Araneo, and unindicted co-conspirators (and government witnesses) Carlton Reeves and James Sellers. Indeed, the only differences between the Constellation scheme and the other ventures of the enterprise were the use of an airplane instead of a vessel and the exclusion of Acosta, Bascaro, Villanueva, and another co-defendant, Gustavo Fernandez, from the initial planning and proposed sharing of profits. These distinctions did not make the Constellation episode a wholly distinct activity. The time frame coincided with the life of the enterprise, the goal was the same as that of the enterprise, the statute violated was the same as the one customarily violated by the enterprise, there was a continuity in the pattern of roles, and the geographical area was identical to that in which the enterprise otherwise operated. See *United States* v. *Lemm*, 680 F.2d 1193, 1199 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110 (1983). The fact that Cobb, rather than Acosta, Bascaro, or Villanueva, orchestrated the venture and considered it separate from the enterprise's affairs did not necessarily make it so (see 84-1164 Pet. 14).

b. Waldrop also urges this Court to use his case as a vehicle to resolve an alleged conflict between the Eighth Circuit and other courts of appeals involving the manner in which the "enterprise" element in a RICO prosecution need be proved (84-1164 Pet. 18-26). The issue arose after *United States* v. *Turkette*, 452 U.S. 576 (1981), where this Court, in holding that RICO applies to wholly illegitimate as well as legitimate enterprises, stated (*id.* at 583) that the enterprise "is an entity separate and apart from the pattern of activity in which it engages." Relying on this language, the Eighth Circuit has held that a RICO enterprise must possess an ascertainable structure "distinct from that inherent in the

conduct of a pattern of racketeering." *United States* v. *Lemm*, 680 F.2d at 1198. See also *United States* v. *Bledsoe*, 674 F.2d 647, 665 (8th Cir. 1982); *United States* v. *Anderson*, 626 F.2d 1358, 1372 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981).

Other courts of appeals have rejected the Eighth Circuit's analysis of *Turkette*. *E.g.*, *United States* v. *Mazzei*, 700 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983); *United States* v. *Cagnina*, 697 F.2d 915, 921 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 856 (1983). While these decisions recognize (as did the court below (Pet. App. 43)) that *Turkette* requires the government to prove both the existence of an "enterprise" and a "pattern of racketeering activity," they also recognize that *Turkette* does not require separate and independent proof of the two elements. *E.g.*, *Mazzei*, 700 F.2d at 89. Indeed, the Court expressly stated in *Turkette* that the proof used to establish the enterprise element "may in particular cases coalesce" with the proof offered to establish the pattern of racketeering activity. 452 U.S. at 583. Were this not the case, *Turkette*'s holding that an enterprise may include a group of individuals associated for wholly illegitimate purposes would be effectively negated. Thus, the enterprise element in a RICO prosecution may be proved, as it was in this case, by showing that an ongoing association of individuals who shared a common purpose acted together to commit a series of racketeering acts.

In any event, Waldrop has not demonstrated that the Eighth Circuit would have reversed his RICO convictions in this case. In *Lemm*, that court affirmed the RICO convictions of three defendants who participated in an insurance fraud scheme involving 17 arson fires. The court found (680 F.2d at 1201) that the government had established the existence of a RICO enterprise with a distinct, ascertainable structure because the proof showed not only that the

defendants had committed the predicate acts of mail fraud but also that they had engaged in "legitimate purchases and repairs of property."[5] Likewise here, the Eighth Circuit's requirement was satisfied because, in addition to the predicate acts of marijuana trafficking, the enterprise made legitimate purchases of farms and a fishing camp. Although the properties were used only to store marijuana for very brief periods, the enterprise did not immediately dispose of them after their usefulness as storage facilities had ended. Like *Lemm*, therefore, this case involved the use of the RICO statute as a weapon against "organized criminal activity" and not against a "sporadic and temporary criminal alliance to commit one of the enumerated RICO crimes" (680 F.2d at 1201). Because it is thus unlikely that the outcome of this prosecution turned on the jurisdiction in which it was brought, the case does not provide a proper vehicle for resolving a conflict among the circuits.

4. Petitioners Hobson and Waldrop claim (84-1148 Pet. 15-20; 84-1164 Pet. 26-28) that the court of appeals erred in upholding the validity of two amendments to a state wiretap authorization. The amendments were necessitated by the fact that Cobb, the target of the electronic surveillance, changed his telephone numbers after the issuing court had approved the initial wiretap application (Pet. App. 5, 11). In each of the two applications for authorization to amend the wiretap order to allow surveillance of the new telephone numbers, the affiant attached a copy of the original order, incorporated it by specific reference, and explained why it needed to be amended (*id.* at 11).

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[5]The defendants in *Lemm* purchased property to be burned. One of the defendants also "act[ed] as a private contractor and repair[ed] the fire damage in order to obtain a larger portion of the insurance proceeds." 680 F.2d at 1197.

Hobson and Waldrop argue that the Florida courts would not have approved the amendments because prior state court decisions have held that, when amendments are necessitated by a change of address during the authorized period of wiretapping, an application to amend must contain a full explanation as to why normal investigative techniques would be unworkable and may not simply incorporate a previous application by reference (84-1148 Pet. 18-20; 84-1164 Pet. 27). This claim was addressed in full by the court of appeals (Pet. App. 13-14). The court agreed that Florida law was controlling, but it rejected Hobson's and Waldrop's contention that the state courts would have disapproved the applications for amendments involved in this case. The court of appeals explained that the distinction between this case and the state intermediate appellate court decisions cited by Hobson and Waldrop lay in the fact that here only the telephone number, and not the residence, was changed and that such a change "could not conceivably have affected the efficacy of alternative investigative techniques." *Id.* at 14.

Petitioners' argument that the court of appeals misinterpreted Florida law by drawing a distinction between this case and the Florida decisions upon which they rely presents no substantial federal question.[6] In any event, it is

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[6]Hobson and Waldrop allege that the court of appeals should have certified the question to the Florida courts rather than answer it. Although certification was a possible course, it was not mandatory. Where, as here, the request to certify was not made until petitions for rehearing were filed, no issue of constitutional dimension was involved, the lawsuit already had been protracted, and the court of appeals obviously believed that it could resolve the issue with available research materials already at hand, its determination should not be disturbed simply because the certification procedure existed but was not used. *Lehman Brothers* v. *Schein*, 416 U.S. 386, 392-395 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); *Harman* v. *Forssenius*, 380 U.S. 528, 534-536 (1965); *Hostetter* v. *Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp.*, 377 U.S. 324, 328-329 (1964). If the rule were otherwise, federal courts could never resolve questions of state law without resort to available certification procedures.

adequately answered in the opinion of the court of appeals.[7] Moreover, nothing in the opinion below conflicts with *United States* v. *Smith,* 726 F.2d 852 (1st Cir. 1984) (en banc). Initially, we note that the court in *Smith* never discussed technical amendments such as those involved in this case; rather, the opinion dealt with the state law procedures for obtaining initial wiretap authorizations, renewals of those authorizations, and substantive amendments permitting the interception of calls involving persons other than those named in the initial authorizations.[8] In any event, the legal analysis employed by the court below is fully consistent with *Smith.* As here, the First Circuit in *Smith* looked to state law in upholding the validity of state wiretaps. The court concluded that the procedures employed by Massachusetts for authorizing applications and amendments violated neither federal law nor the state wiretap statute as

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[7]In a variation on the argument that the applications for the amendments did not comply with Florida law, Hobson also alleges (84-1148 Pet. 15-16) that the affiant, a state law enforcement officer, was not authorized to seek the amendments because the Florida wiretap statute allows only the Governor, the Attorney General, or a State Attorney to apply for a wiretap order. Hobson does not cite any authority for the proposition that simple amendments such as the ones involved here are encompassed within this statutory authorization requirement. Moreover, neither the federal nor the Florida statute contemplates that the high officials authorized to make applications for wiretaps must prepare each one personally and present it to the issuing judge. *Alexander* v. *Harris,* 595 F.2d 87, 89 (2d Cir. 1979); *United States* v. *Harvey,* 560 F. Supp. 1040, 1078 (S.D. Fla. 1982). Because none of the defendants raised this issue at trial, thereby in any event forfeiting their right to have it considered now (Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)), the record does not indicate whether the affiant had the permission of the State Attorney to seek the amendments.

[8]In an appendix to its opinion, the court in *Smith* listed all the applications, renewals, and amendments involved in the case (726 F.2d at 868). The appendix shows five initial applications, five renewals, and 14 amendments. Nearly all of the amendments were for the purpose of naming additional conversants. Only one amendment related to a change in telephone number, and the court's opinion nowhere discusses what procedures, if any, were required to obtain that amendment.

interpreted by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.[9] Waldrop's allegation of a conflict between *Smith* and this case rests upon the erroneous premise that the court below confined its analysis to a "cursory treatment of Florida law" and "disregard[ed]" the fact that Florida law governed the validity of the applications (84-1164 Pet. 28). The opinion below demonstrates that the court did no such thing.

5. Petitioner Hobson argued in the court below (Pet. App. 35-39) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction on any of the six counts on which he was convicted. In this Court, he contends (84-1148 Pet. 21-27) that factual misrepresentations in the government's brief deprived him of due process of law because the court of appeals, in rejecting his sufficiency argument, "apparently chose to rely on the government's assertions" in its brief (*id.* at 24-25). This claim lacks merit.

At the outset, we acknowledge that the government's 154-page brief in the court of appeals contained one clear factual error. See page 22, *infra*. Moreover, we agree with Hobson that, upon discovery of this inadvertent mistake, the better course would have been for the government to advise the court of appeals of the error by letter or other supplemental pleading.[10] As for the other "misrepresentations" that Hobson attributes to the government (see pages

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[9]The fact that the First Circuit in *Smith* looked to an opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts for guidance in interpreting the state wiretap statute does not demonstrate the existence of a conflict. The Massachusetts state court opinion was directly on point, whereas there are no controlling decisions of the Florida Supreme Court. As we have already shown, however, the absence of definitive state court precedent in Florida did not preclude the court of appeals from resolving the state law issue itself (see note 6, *supra*).

[10]While we agree with Hobson that the government should have corrected the error in its brief, we take issue with his assertion (84-1148 Pet. 25) that the error was other than inadvertent. The record in this

22-23, *infra*), our review of the record convinces us that the most that can be said is that the government's brief may have summarized the evidence against Hobson with less than complete precision. In fact, however, it appears to us that the "errors" alleged by Hobson—with the one exception noted—actually amount to nothing more than aggressive advocacy that Hobson has chosen, with equal or greater aggressiveness, to characterize as "horrendous misstatement[s]" (84-1148 Pet. 22). In any event, it is clear, as we demonstrate below, that Hobson could not have suffered any prejudice regardless of how one characterizes the government's brief and that the record evidence amply supports his convictions.

Contrary to the entire premise of Hobson's argument, the court of appeals' opinion shows that it did not simply adopt the factual assertions in the government's brief. In uncommon fashion, the opinion below contains its own record citations for the facts relied upon by the court in rejecting Hobson's sufficiency claim (Pet. App. 35-36). The inclusion of these references demonstrates that the court did not ignore the contentions made in Hobson's reply brief and at oral argument that there were misstatements in the government's brief. Accordingly, there is no basis for concluding that the court below abdicated its duty to make an independent examination of the record in light of the contentions advanced by the parties.

More importantly, the facts recited by the court of appeals (Pet. App. 35-36) are supported by the record. The record shows that petitioners Hobson and Waldrop were partners (36 R. 141-143; 40 R. 55); that Waldrop was one of

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multi-defendant case is massive, and the facts pertaining to each individual defendant are scattered throughout that record. In these circumstances, inadvertent errors, while regrettable, are certainly understandable.

the "best buyers" that the marijuana enterprise had (40 R. 55); and that Hobson and Waldrop dealt with the enterprise's accountant in connection with marijuana transactions on 25 or 30 occasions (40 R. 61-62). The record also shows that Waldrop, acting with Hobson and another individual, made a $1,500,000 advance payment for a shipment of marijuana by airplane; that Hobson subsequently told co-conspirator Bill Cobb that Cobb should either return the money or deliver the marijuana (38 R. 186-187, 220-223; 40 R. 54-55; GX 126); and that trucks furnished by Waldrop and Hobson came to the clandestine landing site in Florida where the Constellation was scheduled to arrive (39 R. 10-12). The record also shows the presence of both Hobson and Waldrop at various of the organization's stash houses. Specifically, both acquired marijuana at the Cottondale farm (38 R. 154); Waldrop stacked some of the marijuana at the Tallahassee warehouse (40 R. 53); and Hobson came to the farm in Madison County in an 18-wheel truck in order to acquire 25,000 pounds of marijuana (36 R. 142; 40 R. 55).

These facts from the record fully support the court of appeals' conclusion that, "[i]n light of the massive quantities of marijuana involved, the frequency with which Waldrop and Hobson had occasion to deal with the other members of the enterprise, the fact that Hobson, Waldrop and Cobb were described as the principal organizers of the Constellation episode * * *, and the presence of both Hobson and Waldrop at various of the organization's stash houses on numerous occasions" (Pet. App. 39), the jury was warranted in finding that Hobson knew the marijuana was imported. See *United States* v. *Corbin*, 734 F.2d 643, 652-653 (11th Cir. 1984). See also *Turner* v. *United States*, 396 U.S. 398, 416 n.29 (1970). These facts also support the court of appeals' conclusion that Hobson and Waldrop were more than "mere purchasers" and that the evidence was more than sufficient to show that they joined a conspiracy with the other co-defendants (Pet. App. 38).

Nor is it plausible to contend that the court of appeals' rejection of Hobson's sufficiency claim could have been premised upon government-induced inaccuracies. The statement of facts in the government's brief consisted of 31 pages with appropriate record references, and Hobson does not claim that there were any errors in that lengthy statement. Rather, his claim is directed to statements on pages 137 and 139 of the government's brief, made in response to Hobson's argument that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions on Counts 3 and 4.

On page 139 of the government's brief, the government erroneously stated that Count 4 related to the *Tanila* boatload. We acknowledge that Count 4 charged Hobson with importing marijuana aboard the Constellation aircraft rather than the *Tanila*. But the court of appeals recognized this obvious mistake and placed no reliance on it; the court's opinion correctly states that "Hobson and Waldrop's convictions arose out of their involvement in two smuggling ventures: the 'Tallahassee warehouse' and 'Constellation' episodes" (Pet. App. 35). What Hobson characterizes as a "false statement, pure and simple" (84-1148 Pet. 24) thus played no role whatsoever in the affirmance of his conviction on Count 4.

Hobson also challenges (84-1148 Pet. 22) the government's characterization of the evidence to support his conviction on Count 3 (conspiracy to import marijuana) by attacking certain statements made on page 137 of the government's brief. There, referring to the various marijuana storage sites used by the enterprise, the government stated that "middlemen such as Hobson and Waldrop stood by awaiting the completion of the counting and weighing, after which they immediately removed sizable portions of the massive loads" (*ibid.*). The brief continued by stating, with reference to Hobson and Waldrop, that "[t]hey were not mere customers. Their constant readiness to take charge of large quantities of marijuana at whichever storage site

they had been directed to demonstrates that they played a substantial role in the importation activities" (*id.* at 137-138 (footnote omitted)).[11]

Hobson apparently objects to the representations that he and Waldrop were "standing by" and that they were "constantly ready" to purchase large quantities of marijuana (84-1148 Pet. 22). Hobson's objections on this score amount to little more than semantic quibbles. A more precise argument demonstrating that Hobson and Waldrop were not just mere customers and that they were ready to buy large quantities of marijuana would have noted that both of them visited the organization's stash houses, that Waldrop had stacked marijuana at the Tallahassee warehouse where

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[11]The full paragraphs from which petitioner quotes read as follows (Appellee Br. 137-138 (citations and footnote omitted)):

> In this case the government proved that conspirators other than Waldrop and Hobson brought marijuana from outside the United States to various locations in Florida and Georgia. The importation venture did not end at the shore, since the marijuana was immediately destined for an internal location. The internal destination points were storage sites such as different farms or a warehouse in Tallahassee. There, middlemen such as Hobson and Waldrop stood by awaiting the completion of the counting and weighing, after which they immediately removed sizable portions of the massive loads.
>
> From the evidence of presence at the storage sites at a delivery time the jury could fairly conclude that Waldrop and Hobson were trusted members of the enterprise and that they knew of the delivery plans in advance. From the frequency of their involvement the jury also could infer that Waldrop and Hobson knew of the scope of the delivery activity. They were not mere customers. Their constant readiness to take charge of large quantities of marijuana at whichever storage site they had been directed to demonstrates that they played a substantial role in the importation activities by providing assurances that the importation would be successful and by minimizing the risk of loss to the importers, a risk that increased with each moment that the marijuana remained in storage. In fact, on one occasion they paid $1,500,000 in advance for a part of the Constellation load.

40,000 pounds had been set aside for him, and that Hobson had picked up 25,000 pounds in a huge truck. See pages 4-6, *supra*. That they were not mere customers is further demonstrated by their advance payment of $1,500,000 for marijuana, an action that clearly facilitated the importation of marijuana in the Constellation aircraft.[12]

In short, there is no reason to remand the sufficiency question "for reconsideration in light of an accurate statement of facts" (84-1148 Pet. 27).

6. Petitioner Hobson claims (84-1148 Pet. 27-29) that government misrepresentations caused the district court to disqualify his original counsel, thereby depriving him of representation by counsel of his choice. Because Hobson failed to raise this issue in the court of appeals, it should not be considered by this Court. See, *e.g.*, *United States* v. *Lovasco*, 431 U.S. 783, 788 n.7 (1977). In any event, nothing in the record supports a claim of prosecutorial misrepresentation that caused the trial judge to be "misled" (84-1148 Pet. 28) when he issued a pretrial order disqualifying Hobson's first counsel based on the fact that the testimony of two government witnesses might have implicated that lawyer in the marijuana trafficking scheme. The decision to disqualify the lawyer was premised upon sworn affidavits of the two witnesses. Hobson unsuccessfully challenged the disqualification order prior to trial. *United States* v. *Hobson*, 672 F.2d 825 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 906 (1982). The court of appeals' opinion in that case sets forth the facts contained in the witnesses' affidavits (672 F.2d at 826); those facts leave no room to doubt the correctness of the district court's ruling. The lawyer's alleged involvement in the drug trafficking scheme was substantial, and his

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[12]Hobson's claim (84-1148 Pet. 23) that he had no knowledge of "specific delivery plans" is refuted by the trucks he and Waldrop brought to the planned landing site of the Constellation (39 R. 10-12).

representation of Hobson was frought with the potential for a serious conflict of interest. The fact that the witnesses ultimately presented their testimony without referring to the misconduct of the disqualified lawyer did not belie the allegations contained in their affidavits. Moreover, filing the motion to disqualify Hobson's original counsel was the only prudent action available to the government prior to trial since it could not know for certain whether the testimony would prove necessary or, even if not necessary, might come out at trial inadvertently. The fact that neither event occurred has no bearing on the propriety of the government's motion when filed or the district court's ruling when made.

CONCLUSION

The petitions for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respecfully submitted.

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MAY 1985

DOJ-1985-05